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BAIL AND MASS INCARCERATION
Samuel R. Wiseman
It is widely known that the United States has the
highest incarceration rate in the developed world, and
the causes and ramifications of mass incarceration are
the subject of intense study. It is also increasingly widely
recognized that the high rates of pretrial detention, often
linked to the use of money bail, are unjust, expensive,
and often counterproductive. But, so far, the links
between money bail, pretrial detention, and mass
incarceration have been largely unexplored. Our
criminal justice system relies primarily on plea bargains
to secure convictions at a relatively low cost. And, as
shown by recent empirical work, the bail system, which
results in high pretrial detention rates for indigent
defendants, plays a significant role in incentivizing
quick pleas, and leads to more convictions and longer
sentences. Releasing more defendants pretrial would
generate more pretrial motions, lengthier plea
negotiations, and more trials, and would thus raise the
cost—in the form of prosecutors, public defenders, and
judges—of convictions and imprisonment. In other
words, if we release significantly more defendants
pretrial, we will have to either spend more on criminal
justice or convict fewer people and punish them less
severely. In addition to inducing quick, inexpensive
guilty pleas from defendants unable to post bond, money
bail also plays a more subtle role in sustaining high
incarceration rates. Money bail, by its very nature,
discriminates based on wealth, and thus provides a
built-in sorting mechanism—politically weak lowincome defendants are pushed into the quick-plea
process, while wealthier defendants are able to obtain
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release and the increased access to more robust process
that it affords. If politically better-represented wealthy
and middle-class defendants were detained, and thus
subjected to at least some of the same pressures to plead
guilty as indigent defendants, there would, in all
likelihood, be more demand for reform.
This Article explores the role of bail in mass
incarceration, concluding that opponents of mass
incarceration should pay increased attention to the
pretrial process as a locus of reform. Relatedly, it
analyzes the likely impact of the bail–plea bargain link
on future bail reform—which, of course, serves
important interests beyond reducing the prison
population, such as fairness and the avoidance of
wrongful convictions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The movement for reforming the U.S. bail process—a system in
which thousands of non-dangerous, low-income defendants are
jailed pretrial simply because they cannot afford bail1—is gaining
momentum. A recent federal appellate panel held that Houston’s
money bail system violates due process and equal protection rights,2
and similar legal arguments have succeeded in local and federal
courts around the country—most recently in California.3 These
decisions build upon a growing number of legislative bail reforms.4
These changes are important for the defendants who are able to
avoid jail as a result of them and the changes will likely have an
impact far beyond the pretrial process. Bail reform could be a useful
tool in the largely unsolved crisis of U.S. mass incarceration.5
Recognizing the effect that bail reform could have on mass
incarceration also has important political and economic

See THOMAS H. COHEN & BRIAN A. REAVES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T
JUSTICE, NCJ 214994, PRETRIAL RELEASE OF FELONY DEFENDANTS IN STATE COURTS 1
(2007), http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/prfdsc.pdf (showing that five out of six defendants who
are jailed pretrial are in jail because they could not afford the bail amount set).
2 See ODonnell v. Harris Cty., 892 F.3d 160–163 (5th Cir. 2018).
3 See Bob Egelko, Court ruling could change state’s approach to bail, S.F. CHRON. (Jan.
25, 2018), https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/Court-ruling-could-change-state-sapproach-to-12526554.php (describing a state appeals court ruling invalidating detention of
a defendant who stole a $5 bottle of cologne and could not afford the $350,000 bail set in his
case).
4 In 2017, New Jersey implemented an ordinance and constitutional amendment that
substantially expanded pretrial release. See N.J. CONST art. I, para. 11, amended by N.J.
Pretrial Detention Amend., Public Question No. 1 (2014) (amending the state constitution,
which previously required courts to grant bail and limited other pretrial options); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A: 162-15 (West 2018) (“Monetary bail may be set for an eligible defendant only when
it is determined that no other conditions of release will reasonably assure the eligible
defendant’s appearance in court when required.”). In 2018, Atlanta joined the ranks of large
metropolitan areas that have instituted similar reforms. ATLANTA, GA., ORDINANCE 18-O1045 (Feb. 6, 2018) (eliminating cash bond requirements for pretrial release); Rhonda Cook,
Atlanta mayor signs new ordinance changing cash bail system in a nod to the needy, ATL. J.CONST. (Feb. 5, 2018), http://www.myajc.com/news/local/atlanta-council-oks-changes-cashbail-system-nod-the-needy/SW50dABJAtWgBwpB4vtgBN/; see also Press Release, Laura
and John Arnold Found., More than 20 cities and states adopt risk assessment tool to help
judges
which
defendants
to
detain
prior
to
trial
(June
26,
2015)
http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/more-than-20-cities-and-states-adopt-risk-assessmenttool-to-help-judges-decide-which-defendants-to-detain-prior-to-trial/ (describing cities and
states that apply sophisticated predictive models to assess defendant’s likely dangerousness
and flight risk, which increases the number of defendants released pretrial).
5 See infra Part II (discussing the empirical literature that shows the link between the
bail system and mass incarceration).
1
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implications for future reform efforts and the scholarly literature in
these areas.
The U.S. has the highest incarceration rate in the developed
world, and the causes and ramifications of mass incarceration are
the subject of intense study.6 It is also increasingly recognized that
the high rates of pretrial detention in many jurisdictions, often
linked to the use of money bail, are unjust, expensive, and often
counterproductive.7 But, so far, the links between money bail,
pretrial detention, and mass incarceration have been largely
unexplored.8 The bail system plays an important role in keeping the
wheels turning in the larger criminal justice bureaucracy, which, as
Rachel Barkow notes, was built up when violent crime rates were
high.9 This system remains stubbornly in place, causing the U.S. to

6 See, e.g., JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION – AND
HOW TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 6 (2017) (noting that high incarceration rates are driven by
an “increased rate at which people get sent to prison in the first place” due in large part to
“prosecutorial toughness” in charging decisions); MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW:
MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 6-8 (2010) (discussing the War on
Drugs, its racial dimensions, and its impact on mass incarceration); CHRISTIAN PARENTI,
LOCKDOWN AMERICA: POLICE AND PRISONS IN THE AGE OF CRISIS xii (2000) (noting that the
criminal justice buildup occurred first “in response to racial upheaval and political rebellion,”
then as a means of managing economic “inequality and surplus populations”).
7 See, e.g., Paul Heaton et al., The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial
Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV. 711, 713 (2017) (describing the serious consequences of pretrial
detention, including, for example, loss of employment and child custody); Crystal S. Yang,
Toward an Optimal Bail System, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1399, 1416–37 (2017) (providing
comprehensive documentation of similar consequences to defendants and to society); Laura
I. Appleman, Justice in the Shadowlands: Pretrial Detention, Punishment, & the Sixth
Amendment, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1297, 1320–21, 1363 (2012) (describing how pretrial
detention causes nonviolent offenders to become dangerous, among other problems); Marc
Miller & Martin Guggenheim, Pretrial Detention and Punishment, 75 MINN. L. REV. 335, 368–
69 (1990) (describing a variety of negative effects of pretrial detention); Samuel R. Wiseman,
Pretrial Detention and the Right to Be Monitored, 123 YALE L.J. 1344, 1353–58 (describing
impacts on defendants, their families, and society).
8 Discussions of bail reform and incarceration have tended to focus on the direct reduction
of the number of inmates in jails and prisons that results from shrinking pretrial detention
rates. See, e.g., Alexander Shalom, Bail Reform as a Mass Incarceration Reduction Technique,
66 RUTGERS L. REV. 921, 927 (2014) (discussing how reducing the New Jersey pretrial
detainee population by 20% would “represent a nearly 6% reduction in the total incarcerated
population in the state”). Many discussions also focus on the link between pretrial detention
and conviction, but they do not tend to directly discuss the contributions of pretrial detention
to mass incarceration and the potential for bail reform to reduce the mass incarceration
problem. For discussion of the pretrial detention-conviction link, see infra Part II; SHIMA
BARADARAN BAUGHMAN, THE BAIL BOOK 87 (noting that “pretrial detention may be the
crucial factor leading to a conviction or the direct cause of prison sentences”).
9 Rachel Barkow, The Criminal Regulatory State, in THE NEW CRIMINAL JUSTICE
THINKING 33, 33–36 (Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra Natapoff eds., 2017).
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incarcerate more offenders, including many charged with drug and
similar non-violent offenses, despite the significant social and
financial costs of the system.10
Most convictions obtained in the U.S. are misdemeanor
convictions,11 which result in fees and often incarceration.12
Moreover, a prior misdemeanor conviction followed by additional
convictions can lead to a felony conviction and longer sentence.13
The vast majority of misdemeanor and felony convictions are
obtained through plea bargains.14 An under-appreciated driver of
this chain of events is the U.S. approach to bail, which generates
high pretrial detention rates and plays a significant role in
incentivizing quick pleas.15 The effect of bail on plea bargains and
incarceration is not surprising, although its magnitude may be.

Id. at 35–36.
See Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1314–15, 1320–21
(2012) (observing that the individuals serving time in prison for felony convictions are “only
the tip of the iceberg” and that “[m]ost U.S. convictions are misdemeanors”).
12 See id. at 1326 (citing Bridget McCormack, Economic Incarceration, 25 WINDSOR Y.B.
OF ACCESS TO JUST. 223, 226–27 (2007)) (describing a study of misdemeanor cases in
Michigan that demonstrated how administrative fees charged to defendants led to increased
incarceration).
13 See id. at 1324 (telling a story of a Kenneth Nichols, whose uncounseled misdemeanor
conviction increased the sentence on a later conviction by two years).
14 See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143 (2012) (compiling Department of Justice
statistics and observing that “[n]inety-seven percent of federal convictions and ninety-four
percent of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas”); see also Stephanos Bibas, Plea
Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2464, 2470–71 (2004) (describing
the ease of plea bargaining as compared to obtaining a conviction through trial); LINDSEY
DEVERS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE, ASSISTANCE PLEA AND CHARGE BARGAINING: RESEARCH
SUMMARY, BJA Report (Jan. 2011) (estimating the percentage of convictions obtained
through plea to be 90%–95%); MATTHEW R. DUROSE & PATRICK A. LANGAN, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS (2007) (concluding that 95% of
felony convictions are the result of a plea); THE PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT
AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 9 (1967) (estimating that as many
as 95 % of misdemeanor convictions were obtained through plea bargaining).
15 See Heaton et al., supra note 7, at 785–86 (describing evidence that suggests that
misdemeanor defendants “pleaded guilty simply to go home, not because of the strength of
the case against them”); see also Bibas, supra note 14, at 2493 (observing that “pretrial
detention places a high premium on quick plea bargains in small cases, even if the defendant
would probably win acquittal at an eventual trial”). For a discussion of potential links
between plea bargaining and mass incarceration, see Cynthia Alkon, An Overlooked Key to
Reversing Mass Incarceration: Reforming the Law to Reduce Prosecutorial Power in Plea
Bargaining, 15 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 191, 200–201 (2015). For a
discussion of how an improved heuristic for determining pretrial release or detention could
allow defendants to make more informed decisions about entering a plea or not, and could
change prosecutors’ charging decisions, see Shima Baradaran Baughman, Costs of Pretrial
Detention, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1, 5-7 (2017).
10
11
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Defendants who are detained pretrial are highly motivated to agree
to a plea.16 Each day in jail is a missed day of work and time with
family, and each day increases the likelihood of losing employment
and housing.17 Pretrial detention also lowers the likelihood of
winning at trial.18 Further, many defendants detained pretrial are
charged with relatively low-level crimes with short sentences, and
when pretrial detention counts toward their sentence, these
defendants serve only a few days post-conviction.19 Thus, a plea
often results in a quicker release than contesting the case, whatever
the ultimate outcome.
Released defendants do not face the same pressures as detained
defendants, and they are in a better position to resist unfavorable
plea offers, file motions to suppress, seek dismissal, and, in rare
cases, proceed to trial.20 Releasing more defendants pretrial, then,
would lead to more pretrial motions, lengthier plea negotiations,
and more trials and would thus raise the cost—in the form of
prosecutors, public defenders, and judges—of convictions and
imprisonment.21 Pretrial detention, which substantially limits the
number of released defendants in the system as a whole, thus allows
prosecutors to charge more people with crimes.22 And an increase
16 See Wiseman, supra note 7, at 1356 (observing that defendants are incentivized to take
a quick plea deal regardless of innocence due to high defense burdens).
17 Id. at 1356–1357; BARADARAN BAUGHMAN, supra note 8, at 87-89; Baradaran
Baughman, Costs, supra note 15, at 5-7.
18 See, e.g., MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT:
HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 205 (1979) (providing empirical
evidence that pretrial detention lowers the likelihood of winning a case, even when controlling
for potentially confounding variables such as the seriousness of the crime with which the
defendant was charged); COHEN & REAVES, supra note 1, at 7 (showing that in state courts,
60% of defendants who were released pretrial were convicted, whereas 78% of defendants
detained pretrial were convicted, although showing a higher conviction rate for released
misdemeanor defendants than for detained defendants (14% and 9%, respectively)).
19 See Bibas, supra note 14, at 2492 (“[P]retrial detention can approach or even exceed the
punishment that a court would impose after trial.”).
20 Cf. Caleb Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail: II, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1125,
1147 (1965) (describing several factors that limit the “quality of representation” for jailed
defendants, including, for example, lower-quality representation (since the attorney must
visit an often-distant jail) and “a reduction in the frequency of pretrial consultation”).
21 See infra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
22 This is true in economic models and in reality. The models predict that jailed defendants
have a higher probability of conviction if they proceed to trial because they have limited access
to attorneys and other resources to prove their innocence. A higher likelihood of conviction at
trial weakens these defendants’ position in the bargaining process. See William M. Landes,
An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & Econ. 61, 62-63 (1971) (expounding economic
models to calculate different factors’ effects on the demand for trial and settlements, as well
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in the percentage of arrestees charged by prosecutors is, according
to a leading scholar, the “primary driver” of mass incarceration.23
Accordingly, if we release significantly more defendants pretrial as
a result of meaningful bail reform, we will have to either spend more
on prosecutors and judges24 or convict fewer people and punish
them less severely, which creates a complex scenario for reform.
In addition to inducing quick, inexpensive guilty pleas from
defendants unable to post bond, money bail also plays a more subtle
role in sustaining our high incarceration rate. If more politically
better-represented wealthy and middle-class defendants were
detained,25 and thus subjected to some of the same pressures to
plead guilty as indigent defendants, there would, in all likelihood,
be more demand for reform. Money bail, by its very nature,
discriminates based on wealth, and thus provides a built-in sorting
mechanism—politically weak, low-income defendants are pushed
into the quick-plea process, while wealthier defendants are able to
obtain release and practical access to the more robust process that
it affords.26 Bail, as a sorting mechanism, is a key yet underrecognized facet of a system that Alexandra Natapoff describes as a
penal pyramid, where, for the elite at the top, the criminal “process
is sensitive to evidence, transparent, accountable, and
hypervisible,”27 but for the bottom of the pyramid, these types of

as the probability of conviction); see also infra Part II and accompanying text (discussing
recent empirical studies documenting a connection between pretrial detention and pleas).
23 PFAFF, supra note 6, at 6 (2017) (“The primary driver of incarceration is increased
prosecutorial toughness when it comes to charging people, not longer sentences.”).
24 See infra Part II.C.
25 COHEN & REAVES, supra note 1, at 1 (showing that of the defendants who are detained
pretrial, “5 in 6” were detained because they could not afford bail); see also Wiseman, supra
note 7, at 1346 n.2 (providing other statistics showing that many defendants detained pretrial
are low-income defendants).
26 See infra notes 53 and 118 and accompanying text (noting how many felony defendants
cannot afford a bail of $1,000 and the discrepancy in conviction rate between defendants jailed
pretrial and those released on bail); cf. Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Jumping Bunnies and Legal
Rules: The Organizational Sociologist and the Legal Scholar Should be Friends, in THE NEW
CRIMINAL JUSTICE THINKING 246, 265 (Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra Natapoff eds., 2017)
(observing from a case study of misdemeanor arrests and convictions in New York City that
the lack of criminal process given to the defendants was largely “a story about frontline actors
using the various tools of the criminal process as a means to sort, engage, and regulated
defendants over time”).
27 Alexandra Natapoff, The Penal Pyramid, in THE NEW CRIMINAL JUSTICE THINKING 71,
72 (Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra Natapoff eds., 2017).
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protective rules have little relevance because outcomes “are driven
by institutional practices and inegalitarian social relations.”28
The inherent discrimination of money bail is exacerbated by
many jurisdictions’ reliance on fixed bail schedules, which set a
specific bond amount for different charges and are often blind, in
practice, to defendants’ ability to pay.29 Additionally, both state and
federal statutes direct judges in the pretrial process to consider
factors that implicitly benefit wealthy defendants.30 Even portions
of the statutes ostensibly designed to protect low-income defendants
from pretrial detention primarily benefit the wealthy, who can hire
attorneys to make complex procedural arguments against pretrial
detention.31 Because wealthier defendants more frequently avoid
pretrial detention and the quick pleas it helps induce, they are able
to engage in a more robust defense of the charges against them.32
The system thus works much better for wealthier defendants than
for the politically weak lower-income class, ensuring that those

Id.
See PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., PRETRIAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA: A SURVEY OF COUNTY
PRETRIAL RELEASE POLICIES, PRACTICES, AND OUTCOMES 8 (2009), https://university.
pretrial.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=d4c7feb255be-ccd0-f06a-02802f18eeee&forceDialog=0 (showing that 51% of jurisdictions surveyed
used bail schedules “both before and at initial appearance”)
30 The federal Bail Reform Act directs judges making the bail decision to consider, among
other factors, “employment” and “financial resources.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(3) (2012). States
such as Arizona, Florida, and South Carolina use the same language. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-3967 (West 2018); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 903.046 (West 2018); S.C. CODE ANN. § 71-15-30
(West 2018).
31 The Bail Reform Act directs judges to release rather than detain defendants pretrial if
an alternative to detention would “reasonably assure” the defendant’s presence at trial. 18
U.S.C. § 3142(b)-(c) (2012). For examples of wealthy defendants’ attorneys persuading judges
to release defendants under expensive self-funded home monitoring regimes, see United
States v. Karni, 298 F.Supp.2d 129, 130-31, 133 (D.D.C. 2004) (ordering that defendant,
charged with acquiring nuclear materials, be released based on $100,000 cash payment,
$75,000 bond, and home monitoring) and United States v. Dreier, 596 F.Supp.2d 831, 832–
833 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (ordering that defendant, charged with fraud amounting to $400 million,
be release through a commitment to home monitoring by “armed security guards” and other
conditions).
32 Only wealthy defendants can afford the bail amounts often set by judges. See, e.g.,
COHEN & REAVES, supra note 118, at 1 (showing that only 1 in 10 defendants can afford bail
set at $100,000 and above and seven in ten defendants can afford bail set at $5,000 or lower,
but the mean and median bail amounts between 1990 and 2004 were $9,000 and $35,800,
respectively); Stuart Rabner, Opinion, Chief justice: Bail reform puts N.J. at the forefront of
fairness,
STAR-LEDGER
(Jan.
9,
2017),
https://www.nj.com/opinion/index.ssf/
2017/01/nj_chief_justice_bail_reform_puts_nj_at_the_forefr.html (claiming that, in New
Jersey in 2012, “1 in 8 inmates were in jail because …they didn’t have enough money to post
even a modest amount of bail”).
28
29
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without the political wherewithal to effectively lobby for change
almost exclusively bear the costs of cheap convictions.33
The connections between bail, pretrial detention, and
incarceration rates have important implications for the future of
reform efforts. Most immediately, they suggest that opponents of
mass incarceration should look to the pretrial bail process as a
potential locus of reform. More speculatively, they suggest that, if
indeed pretrial detention plays a role in maintaining the U.S.’s
current high rate of incarceration, bail reform advocates may face
additional sources of opposition and difficult choices pursuing
change. If bail reform—which, of course, serves important interests
beyond reducing the prison population, such as fairness34 and the
avoidance of wrongful convictions35—forces jurisdictions to choose
between reducing the number of prosecutions or increasing
spending, reform might come at the price of diverting the savings
associated with lower rates of pretrial detention to fund more
prosecutions.36 Finally, jurisdictions with recently-implemented
reforms like New Jersey, Atlanta, and Houston will be important
test cases in the coming years to see how these dynamics play out.37
Part II of this Article explores the procedural role of money bail
33 See Rabner, supra note 32 (explaining that poor defendants may lose jobs while in jail
and cost taxpayers at least $100 per day).
34 See Heaton et al. supra note 7, at 770–71 (describing due process concerns); Appleman,
supra note 7, at 1310 (describing “complex and unfair fee structures” in the bail process); see
also Thompson v. Moss Point, No. 1:15cv182LG–RHW, 2015 WL 10322003 at *1 (S.D. Miss.
Nov. 6, 2015) (finding that Moss Point, Mississippi’s use of secured bail schedules violated
the Equal Protection Clause and concluding that “[i]f the government generally offers prompt
release from custody after arrest upon posting a bond pursuant to a schedule, it cannot deny
prompt release from custody to a person because the person is financially incapable of posting
such a bond”); Cooper v. City of Dothan, 1:15–CV–425–WKW [WO], 2015 WL 10013003 at *1
(M.D. Ala. June 18, 2015) (granting a temporary restraining order to release a pretrial
defendant jailed solely because he could not afford bond and concluding that Dothan,
Alabama’s bail system likely violated the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses).
35 See infra note 69 (discussing how the pretrial process may lead to wrongful convictions).
36 See infra notes 189-92 and accompanying text (discussing the cost savings associated
with bail reform).
37 See supra note 4 (noting legislative reforms throughout the country); CRIMINAL
JUSTICE
REFORM
INFORMATION
CTR.,
N.
J.
COURTS,
https://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/courts/criminal/reform.html (“On Jan. 1, 2017, the state
shifted from a system that relies principally on setting monetary bail as a condition of release
to a risk-based system that is more objective, and thus fairer to defendants because it is
unrelated to their ability to pay monetary bail.”); see also News Release, Mayor’s Office of
Commc’n, Mayor Keisha Lance Bottoms Signs Cash Bond Ordinance into Law (Feb. 6, 2018),
http://www.atlantaga.gov?Home?Components/News/news/11448/1338?backlist=%2F (noting
the promulgation of an ordinance that “eliminates cash bonds”).
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and pretrial detention in maintaining high incarceration rates,
arguing, based on recent empirical work, that they allow the system
to operate at its current cost and capacity by inducing quick,
relatively inexpensive guilty pleas. Part III turns to the political
economy of bail and mass incarceration, arguing that by allowing
wealthier, more politically influential defendants to buy their way
out of the quick-plea track, money bail allows the wealthy and
middle-class to enjoy the benefits of the status quo (cheap
convictions) while concentrating its costs on the poor. Moreover,
many judges and prosecutors—who are influential stakeholders in
reform debates38—are functionally reliant upon pretrial detention
to maintain the high docket clearance and conviction rates that
have become the norm, and upon which they have built careers.39
These dynamics make achieving reform through the political
process difficult. Building from this political economic story, Part IV
explores some of the implications of the interplay between bail and
mass incarceration for the future of reform efforts.
II. BAIL, PRETRIAL DETENTION, AND MASS INCARCERATION:
LOWERING THE COST OF (LENGTHY) CONVICTIONS
Since the 1960s, there has been strong empirical evidence that
the U.S. bail system generates high pretrial detention rates, largely
due to defendants’ inability to pay, and that pretrial detention is
correlated to both an increased likelihood of conviction and
lengthier average sentences.40 Economists and legal scholars
38 See Daniel S. Medwed, Brady’s Bunch of Flaws, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1533, 1548
(2010) (noting prosecutors’ political clout); see also Shirley S. Abrahamson & Robert L.
Hughes, Shall We Dance? Steps for Legislators and Judges in Statutory Interpretation, 75
MINN. L. REV. 1045, 1087 (1991) (noting judges’ “institutional position and personal access to
. . . legislators”).
39 See infra notes 156, 173 and accompanying text (discussing the pressure judges and
prosecutors face to process cases quickly).
40 See Will Dobbie et al., The Effects of Pre-trial Detention on Conviction, Future Crime,
and Employment: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Judges, 108 Am. Econ. Rev. 201, 225
(2018), https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/aer.20161503 (conducting an empirical
analysis that shows that “released defendants have significantly better case outcomes than
detained defendants,” although the significance of the results varies substantially when one
controls for previous crimes committed); see also Yang, supra note 7, at 1421–22 (noting that
the research shows “a negative correlation between pre-trial detention and criminal case
outcomes”); Anne Rankin, The Effect of Pretrial Detention, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 641, 642 Table
1 (1964) (showing a correlation between pretrial detention and conviction, controlling for
certain factors such as prior criminal record); Foote, supra note 20, at 1148-51 (providing a
survey of the empirical studies); Jeffrey Manns, Liberty Takings: A Framework for
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suggest a causal relationship and attribute the link to a variety of
factors—many of which likely combine to influence conviction
rates.41 Detained defendants may plead guilty in exchange for a
time-served sentence,42 and they have more limited access to
attorneys and more difficulty identifying witnesses.43 In addition,
the longer they spend in jail and away from work, the less likely it
is that they will have the resources necessary to retain an attorney
who has a lighter caseload than a free public defender. 44
Indeed, pretrial detainees even typically lack a right to access
legal research materials.45 But a causal link between pretrial
Compensating Pretrial Detainees, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1947, 1972–73 (2005) (providing a
similar, more recent survey of the empirical results); id. at 1981 (“Empirical studies have
repeatedly borne out the common sense insight that those mounting a defense behind prison
walls suffer disadvantages that significantly increase their probability of being convicted or
having to cop a guilty plea.”); William M. Landes, Legality and Reality: Some Evidence on
Criminal Procedure, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 287, 333–35 (1974) (describing how pretrial
detention correlates with longer sentences).
41 See, e.g., Landes, supra note 22, at 72–73 (observing that defendants detained pretrial
have a lower likelihood of success at trial and thus less of a bargaining position in the plea
process, and that they are therefore more likely to agree to a plea).
42 See Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1136 (2008) (“If the
defendant can get a plea to a misdemeanor and time served, then the process constitutes the
whole punishment. Any plea that frees this defendant may be more than advisable—it may
be salvation.”); see also Welsh S. White, A Proposal for Reform of the Plea Bargaining Process,
119 U. PA. L. REV. 439, 444 (1971) (“If the prosecutor believes that the defendant has already
been incarcerated for a sufficient period of time and is willing to recommend a ‘time-in’
sentence, the defendant will invariably agree to plead guilty to obtain immediate freedom.”).
43 For example, pretrial detainees are sometimes only allowed to call their attorneys and
not personal acquaintances, a practice that could prevent them from contacting key potential
witnesses. See, e.g., Steele v. Cicchi, 855 F.3d 494, 499–500 (3d Cir. 2017) (describing a jail’s
“Inmate Guidelines” manual that restricted detainees’ calls to “legal calls” for inmates who
were in “disciplinary lockup,” and requiring general population inmates to make paid or
collect calls). Further, pretrial detainees’ calls to their attorneys often do not go through. See,
e.g., id (noting that the detainee “made three attempts to contact his attorney” and only
reached him on the third try).
44 See Margaret A. Costello, Fulfilling the Unfulfilled Promise of Gideon: Litigation as a
Viable Strategic Tool, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1951, 1964–65 (2014) (noting that prior to litigation
that spurred legislative reform, “indigent pretrial detainees in Massachusetts had no
attorneys because the low rate of compensation created a shortage of lawyers in the assignedcounsel program”); see also Douglas L. Colbert, Prosecution Without Representation, 59 BUFF.
L. REV. 333, 337 (2011) (observing that “[s]tates’ pretrial jails are filled with detainees who
have no lawyer to advocate for their pretrial freedom and who often wait in jail for days,
weeks, and sometimes even months following arrest before obtaining in-court
representation”).
45 Jeremiah F. Donovan, Note, The Jailed Pro Se Defendant and the Right to Prepare a
Defense, 86 YALE L.J. 292, 295, n.14, 15 (1976) (describing numerous cases denying detainees’
requests for materials); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996) (concluding that in the
context of access to materials generally, there is no “abstract, freestanding right to a law
library or legal assistance”). But see Smith v. Harvey Cty. Jail, 889 F.Supp. 426, 429 (D. Kan.
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detention and higher conviction rates has, until recently, been more
difficult to show empirically.
Recent empirical literature strongly indicates that pretrial
detention causes higher plea rates, and higher plea rates in turn
cause both higher conviction rates and longer sentences. It confirms
that, controlling for differences in defendant characteristics and
other factors that would influence the likelihood of conviction, there
is a statistically significant link between pretrial detention and the
likelihood of pleading guilty as well as the number of convictions
and resulting sentence length.46
Thus,
pretrial
detention
generates higher conviction rates largely by securing large numbers
of guilty pleas.47 As one empirical study concludes, “We believe our
estimates [connecting pretrial detention to conviction rates] are
primarily driven by defendant plea behavior.”48 This
Part
explores this literature, first describing earlier work that identified
likely connections between bail, plea rates, and convictions and then
analyzing the more recent empirical support for these theories. This
literature review provides a platform for the functional and political
economic analyses in Parts III and IV.
A. MONEY BAIL LEADS TO THE DETENTION OF INDIGENT DEFENDANTS

The role of money bail in driving guilty pleas, convictions, and
longer sentences involves a number of links, and the pieces to this
puzzle have been incrementally documented through nearly a
century of research. The first link is the connection between bail
practices and the likelihood of a defendant being detained prior to
trial rather than released on bond or other conditions. In 1927,
Arthur Beeley documented how poor defendants in the Chicago bail
system—dominated by money bail and bail bondsmen—were often
jailed pretrial because they could not afford bail bonds set by the
courts.49
Two prominent studies in the 1950s further highlighted this
connection. A report on the New York bail system showed that few
1995) (noting that although jail inmates could not access the law library, a plaintiff’s
“requests for copies of legal materials were granted”).
46 See infra Part II.B.
47 See infra Part II.B.
48 Arpit Gupta, Christopher Hansman, & Ethan Frenchman, The Heavy Costs of High
Bail: Evidence from Judge Randomization, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. 471, 488 (2016).
49 See generally ARTHUR L. BEELEY, THE BAIL SYSTEM IN CHICAGO (2d ed. 1966).

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2018

13

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 53, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 5
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

248

12/18/2018

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:235

judges used the available option of setting alternative, lower
amounts of cash bail for defendants, which allowed a defendant to,
for example, put down a $100 cash deposit rather than obtaining a
$1,000 bond from a bail bondsman. 50 Even in the 1% of cases in
which judges allowed this alternative bail, 33% of defendants were
still unable to afford the cash amount.51 For the many defendants
who remained in the traditional money bail system of paying larger
amounts of cash bail or relying on a bondsman, the study noted that
“it would seem that only the wealthy defendant is able to avail
himself of the opportunity to post cash bail.”52 Researchers who
studied Philadelphia’s bail system similarly observed that state
courts “almost never” allowed defendants to be released on their
own recognizance (an assurance of an appearance at trial) in lieu of
bail and that “no information was elicited during bail-setting as to
the defendant’s financial condition.”53
This resulted in bail
amounts that were “too low to deter the rich, but high enough to
prohibit the poor.”54
Similar observations recurred through the 1960s55
and ’70s56
57
and in more recent literature. A 1965 study concluded that “for a
50 John W. Roberts et al., A Study of the Administration of Bail in New York City, 106 U.
PA. L. REV. 693, 719 (1958).
51 Id. at 720. See also id. at 708 (concluding that “the need to furnish security seems to be
the major stumbling block” and noting the inability of “average low-income city dweller[s]” to
afford bail).
52 Id. at 719.
53 Note, Compelling Appearance in Court: Administration of Bail in Philadelphia, 102 U.
PA. L. REV. 1031, 1036 (1954).
54 Id. (quoting REGINALD HEBER SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR 23 (1919)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
55 See Caleb Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail: I, 113 PA. U. L. REV. 959,
995–96 (1965) (listing several studies that found the majority of defendants could not make
their required bail payments); see also President Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks at the Signing
of the Bail Reform Act of 1966, THE AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, (June 22, 1966),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=27666&st=&st1= (noting poor defendants
stay in jail pretrial only because they are poor, not because they are guilty or more likely to
flee).
56 See, MALCOLM M. FEELEY, supra note 18, at 199–241 (1979) (examining various factors
that lead to high costs at the pretrial stage of criminal cases); see also JOHN. S. GOLDKAMP,
TWO CLASSES OF ACCUSED: A STUDY OF BAIL AND DETENTION IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 21-22
(1979) (describing how bail disparately impacts indigent defendants); RONALD GOLDFARB,
JAILS: THE ULTIMATE GHETTO 29–86 (1975) (arguing that the vast majority of persons in jail
are there because they cannot afford to buy their way out); Samuel R. Wiseman, Fixing Bail,
84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 417, 420 n.10 (2016) (describing literature focusing on bail’s effect
on indigent defendants).
57 See, e.g., Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Address at the National
Symposium on Pretrial Justice (June 1, 2011) https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-
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majority of defendants accused of anything more serious than petty
crimes, the bail system operates effectively to deny rather than to
facilitate liberty pending trial” due to the common practice of
imprisoning defendants pretrial “solely as a result of their
poverty.”58 The study attributed this largely to courts’ general
refusal to consider defendants’ ability to pay in making the bail
decision and their tendency to rely on fixed bail schedules that set
bail amounts solely on the crime charged—in amounts largely
unaffordable to low-income defendants.59 An analysis of the
Philadelphia bail system also noted that judges’ heavy reliance on
the seriousness of the charge or on a bail schedule in making
pretrial release decisions tended to cause release to depend on
defendants’ “differential ability to afford bail.”60
Beyond the link between income and pretrial detention, there is
another strong, long-recognized connection between pretrial
detention, conviction, and longer sentences.61
Until recently,
much of the literature focused on how pretrial detention led to
conviction and longer sentences62 due to its impacts on accessibility
to counsel and general trial preparation,63 although the literature
also noted higher plea rates by detained defendants.64 More recent
empirical studies have specifically documented the connection
general-eric-holder-speaks-national-symposium-pretrial-justice
(noting
that
many
defendants are jailed pretrial due solely to their income).
58 Foote, Constitutional Crisis, supra note 55, at 960.
59 Id. at 994-996.
60 Goldkamp, supra note 56, at 158.
61 See Note, supra note 53, (concluding that “defendants who came to court from jail
received much less favorable treatment as to both the proportions of those convicted and those
receiving prison sentences” and that, controlling for the offense charged, “[o]ver two and onehalf times as many jail defendants got prison terms as is the case for defendants who were
out on bail”); see also Emily Leslie & Nolan G. Pope, The Unintended Impact of Pretrial
Detention on Case Outcomes: Evidence from New York City Arraignments, 60 J.L. & ECON.
529, 531, 554 (2016) (noting a “strong causal relationship between pretrial detention and case
outcomes” and documenting how these findings date back to the 1960s).
62 See Roberts et al., supra note 50, at 727–28 (showing higher percentages of conviction
and longer sentences for defendants detained before trial as opposed to those released on
bail); see also Foote, supra note 55, at 960 (noting the “extraordinary correlation between
pretrial status (jail or bail) and the severity of the sentence after conviction”).
63 See Roberts et al., supra note 50, at 725–26 (discussing decreased access to attorneys
and the outside world generally, the “constant presence of a uniformed officer in the counsel
room,” and the reluctance of acquaintances of the defendant to share information with the
attorney, a “total stranger,” when the defendant is not present).
64 Id. at 725 (noting a defendant’s “despair in some cases resulting in a loss of faith in the
judicial system and the entry of a plea of guilty”); Rankin, supra note 40 (noting that a guilty
plea was related to detention).
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between bail, pleas, and convictions, as discussed in the following
section.
B. PRETRIAL DETENTION INCREASES CONVICTION RATES AND
SENTENCE LENGTH

A group of studies published in the past five years shows a
compelling empirical connection between bail and convictions and
bail and guilty pleas, specifically.65 A 2018 paper authored by
economists and law professors, which investigates felony and
misdemeanor convictions in Philadelphia County and Miami-Dade
Counties, found that as compared to the mean detained defendant,
defendants released pretrial experience more than a 25 percent
change decrease both in the likelihood of guilty conviction and in
the probability of pleading guilty.66 The authors note that a variety
of factors could contribute to the connection between pretrial
detention and conviction, including, for example, the fact that
defendants detained before trial appear before the judge and jury in
“jail uniforms and shackles.”67
But given the similar empirical
link between pretrial release and lower plea rates, the authors
conclude that their results are consistent with “pretrial release
strengthening defendants’ bargaining positions during plea
negotiations.”68
A 2016 study of misdemeanor cases in Harris County, Texas,
reaches similar results, finding that “[c]ompared to similarly
situated releasees, detained defendants are 25% more likely to be
convicted”69 and that “detention increases the likelihood of pleading
guilty by 25% for no reason relevant to guilt.”70 This study also
investigates the impact of pretrial detention on sentencing, finding
that detainees also are “43% more likely to be sentenced to jail.”71

65 For a helpful summary of the link between pretrial detention and conviction and the
empirical studies that have established this—including older studies—see SHIMA BARADARAN
BAUGHMAN, THE BAIL BOOK 83-84.
66 Dobbie et al., supra note 40, at 203 (“[P]retrial release decreases the probability of being
found guilty by 14.0 percentage points, a 24.2 percent change from the mean for detained
defendants....largely driven by a reduction in the probability of pleading guilty, which
decreases by 10.8 percentage points, a 24.5 percent change.”).
67 Id. at 234.
68 Id. at 236.
69 Heaton et al., supra note 7, at 717.
70 Id. at 771.
71 Id. at 717.
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Another 2016 study that focused specifically on whether money
bail drove guilty pleas examined data from misdemeanor and felony
defendants in Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, concluding that “the
presence of money bail increases the likelihood that a defendant is
found guilty by about 12 percent” 72
and that although it is
difficult to tease out the extent to which pleas caused this, the
authors believe that their “estimates are primarily driven by plea
behavior.”73
Still more research has repeated these findings, with one study
of misdemeanor and felony defendants concluding that the “increase
in conviction rates [associated with pretrial detention] is driven by
detainees accepting plea deals more frequently.”74 Another found “a
13% increase in the probability of conviction and 18% increase in
the likelihood of pleading guilty.”75
All of these studies controlled for factors not associated with bail
that could affect the likelihood of conviction and release, including,
for example, race, age, gender, prior offenses, and number of
charged offenses.76 Thus, while the literature has long documented
the link between bail practices and pretrial detention as well as
between bail and the likelihood of conviction, more recent empirical
studies consistently show a strong connection between pretrial
detention and guilty pleas, specifically, as a factor driving the
higher
conviction
rates
for
pretrial
detainees.
As has now been empirically demonstrated, money bail systems
lead to increased pretrial detention of poor defendants, which in
turn generates higher rates of conviction and longer sentences.77
This is discriminatory and unfair,78and may increase the risk of

Gupta et al., supra note 48, at 487.
Id. at 488.
74 Leslie & Pope, supra note 61, at 530.
75 Megan Stevenson, Distortion of Justice: How the Inability to Pay Bail Affects Case
Outcomes, J.L. ECON. & ORG. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 17).
76 See id. at 13 (controlling for age, prior felonies, prior convictions, prior arrests, number
of charges, and severity of charges); Dobbie et al., supra note 40, at 218–29 (controlling for
race, gender, prior offenses, charged offenses, and crime type and severity); Gupta et al.,
supra note 48, at 480 (controlling for age, prior cases, number of offenses, race, gender, and
whether the offense was committed out of state); Leslie & Pope, supra note 53, at 541
(controlling for age, criminal history, and number of counts).
77 See supra notes 60–66.
78 See supra note 30 and infra note 179 and accompanying text (describing the due process
concerns that arise from the traditional bail processes).
72
73
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wrongful convictions.79 Beyond those (significant) objections, money
bail and pretrial detention may contribute to high incarceration
rates by bringing down the cost of convictions and longer sentences.
C. BAIL, PLEAS, AND INCARCERATION: MAKING CONVICTIONS
CHEAPER

Defendants who quickly plead guilty are relatively cheap to
convict.80 They do not take up much of the time of prosecutors,
judges, or, for indigent defendants, appointed counsel, and they
allow prosecutors to charge more people and obtain more
convictions, thus sending more defendants to prison.81 When one
recognizes the criminal justice system as a mass administrative
bureaucracy, as Rachel Barkow has, the importance of achieving
results at the lowest possible costs becomes more apparent;
efficiency is at a “premium” in this system.82 And the system relies
centrally on plea bargains to operate efficiently and produce large
numbers of convictions,83 thus enabling mass incarceration. As
79 See, e.g., Andrew D. Leipold, How the Pretrial Process Contributes to Wrongful
Convictions, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1123, 1124 (2005) (arguing that “one of the causes of
wrongful convictions is the pretrial criminal process, which, even when it is working properly,
can distort the gathering and presentation of exculpatory evidence” and providing supporting
evidence).
80 See Steven Mongrain & Joanne Roberts, Plea bargaining with budgetary constraints, 29
INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 8, 8 (2009) ( “plea bargaining saves money, or . . . more precisely . . . it
saves time, by reducing the time spent in court by both prosecutors and judges.”); see also
Carissa B. Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Recognizing Constitutional Rights at Sentencing,
99 CAL. L. REV. 47, 94 (2011) (noting that plea bargaining “minimizes the number of charges
a prosecutor must prove”); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100
MICH. L. REV. 505, 537 (2001) (“Legislators can help prosecutors pursue guilty pleas, then,
both by creating new crimes and by creating overlapping crimes that allow for chargestacking. To the extent those things help prosecutors charge and convict people at lower cost,
that is to legislators' advantage. Reducing the cost of policing and prosecution means getting
more law enforcement for the dollar, something that legislators should find politically
rewarding.”)
81 See supra note 80; infra notes 83-84.
82 Barkow, supra note 9, at 36.
83 See, e.g. Chief Justice Warren Burger, The State of the Judiciary—1970, 56 A.B.A. J.
929, 931 (1970) (“A reduction from 90 per cent to 80 per cent in guilty pleas requires the
assignment of twice the judicial manpower and facilities—judges, court reporters, bailiffs,
clerks, jurors and courtrooms. A reduction to 70 per cent trebles this demand.”); id. (pointing
to Washington, DC, where, after plea rates “dropped to 65 per cent,” three or four judges could
no longer handle “all serious criminal cases,” and noting that “[b]y 1968, twelve judges out of
fifteen in active service were assigned to the criminal calendar and could barely keep up”);
see also Barkow, supra note 9, at 39 (noting that “[i]n many offices, an emphasis is placed on
processing as many cases as possible because of crushing caseloads,” thus leading to a 95%
plea bargain rate). But see Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure:
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Chief Justice Burger observed in 1970, “It is elementary,
historically and statistically, that systems of courts—the number of
judges, prosecutors, and courtrooms—have been based on the
premise that approximately 90 per cent of all defendants will plead
guilty, leaving only 10 per cent, more or less, to be tried.”84
Without bail-driven pleas, the modern system—one that locks up
astoundingly large numbers of people on the basis of an even higher
plea rate—would collapse absent a significant infusion of resources.
Indeed, Professor John Pfaff believes increasing charging rates—
the percentage of arrestees who are ultimately charged with a
crime—are a direct and primary cause of the U.S. mass
incarceration problem.85 He points to factors such as prosecutorial
discretion, growing numbers of prosecutorial offices and staff,
political incentives, and budgets that are not tied to prison costs as
central drivers of these rates.86 Although not nodding to pretrial
detention specifically,87 Pfaff also describes how an opposition
weakened by underfunded indigent defense and threats of tougher
sentencing has tilted the odds in favor of prosecutors, allowing them
to charge more people.88
From the perspective of easing the prosecutorial path to
conviction and imprisonment, the role of pretrial detention in
directly incentivizing plea bargains has, perhaps, not received due
attention. As economists explain, defendants accept a plea if it
“entails a lower cost than going to trial,”89 and pretrial detention
The Warren and Burger Courts’ Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L.J. 185, 221-222 (1983)
(arguing that the criminal justice system could still operate efficiently without pleas); see also
Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant’s Right to Trial: Alternatives to
the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931, 948 (1983) (arguing that “the annual cost
of providing three-day jury trials to every felony defendant who reaches the trial stage
probably would not exceed $843 million,” that this “would represent a 3.2% increase in civil
and criminal justice expenditures in the United States over the level in 1979,” and that plea
bargaining is not essential for an economically efficient criminal justice system).
84 Burger, supra note 83, at 931.
85 PFAFF, supra note 6, at 6.
86 Id. at 134-45.
87 See PFAFF, supra note 6, at 136 (noting that prosecutors can be “more aggressive against
defendants with longer criminal histories” including being “more insistent on higher bail
amounts”).
88 See id. at 135–37 (discussing prosecutors use of tough sentencing laws as “bargaining
chips” instead of tools of punishment and discussing overworked, underpaid public defenders’
offices).
89 Thomas Miceli, The Economics of Criminal Procedure 6 (Univ. of Conn., Dep’t of Econ.
Working
Paper
Series,
Working
Paper
No.
2007-24,
2007),
http://web2.uconn.edu/economics/working/2007-24.pdf.
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makes trial look far more costly to the average defendant. The many
defendants charged with misdemeanors with relatively short
potential sentences will often already have served most of the time
they would spend in prison if they receive time-served credit; they
therefore choose to plead guilty and obtain a quick release.90 These
defendants, with little access to witnesses, attorneys, or research
materials, face bleak prospects for winning their cases if they
proceed to trial.91
And when detained defendants do manage to
obtain representation, counsel might typically be more inclined to
work with the prosecutor toward a plea because counsel is aware of
likely future interactions with this same prosecutor and wishes to
maintain a “good relationship” in light of this knowledge.92
In contrast with defendants who are detained pretrial and
incentivized to plead out, defendants who seek, for example, to have
evidence suppressed, engage in extended bargaining, and/or
proceed to trial consume more of prosecutors’ and judges’ limited
resources. 93 Economists predict that increasing pretrial release
through bail reform would reduce “the fraction of defendants
convicted” because defendants would have a higher chance of
success at trial and thus a stronger position in the plea bargaining
process, which, in turn, would increase “demand for trials” and
cause “court delay.”94 In simpler terms, if the average cost of
convictions rose because more defendants exercised these more
expensive procedural rights, jurisdictions would either have to
increase their spending on criminal justice—hire more judges,
prosecutors, and public defenders—or convict fewer people. Indeed,
Chief Justice Burger suggested that a mere 10% decline in plea
rates could double the number of judicial resources needed.95 As
argued in this Part, bail and pretrial detention play a role in
maintaining the status quo of high conviction, supervision, and
incarceration rates by helping to induce the quick, cheap pleas that
keep overall costs down.

See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
Miceli, supra note 89, at 6.
92 White, supra note 42, at 444.
93 See id. (“Unlike the defendant in prison, the bailed defendant can only profit by
postponement of his case.”).
94 Landes, supra note 22, at 72-73.
95 See, Burger, supra note 83, at 931.
90
91
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D. SUPPLY AND DEMAND

Meaningful bail reform would decrease pretrial detention rates,
as early numbers from New Jersey’s recent reforms suggest.96 And
as highlighted by the empirical work outlined above, higher release
rates lead to fewer pleas.97 Released defendants are more likely, and
better able, to pursue a vigorous defense.98 If more defendants were
released, public defenders would have to engage in more
investigation and bargaining and file more pretrial motions, which
prosecutors would have to respond to and judges would have to rule
on. With caseloads already high, more prosecutors, public
defenders, and judges would thus be necessary if the system were
to produce the same number of convictions that it did before bail
reform.
Rough, back-of-the-envelope numbers provide a hint at the types
of costs involved when more judges, prosecutors, and other key
members of the criminal justice system must be hired or, in the case
of jurors, recruited. Total judicial and legal direct expenditures in
criminal cases in fiscal year 2012—the latest year for which
detailed, compiled data are available—are approximately $15
billion at the federal level, $21 billion at the state level, and $22
billion at the local level.99 These
numbers
include
court,
prosecution, and public defense expenses such as salaries, supply
purchases, and capital expenditures on facilities and other
equipment.100 They exclude corrections and police protection
expenses as well as any duplicative intergovernmental spending
that could potentially be counted twice, such as when the federal
96 See CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM INFO. CTR., N.J. COURTS, CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM
STATISTICS:
JAN.
01,
2017
DEC.
31,
2017
Chart
C,
https:www.judiciary.state.nj.us/courts/assets/criminal/cjrreport.pdf (showing a 35.7%
decrease in the number of non-sentenced pretrial detainees in New Jersey from December 31,
2015 to December 31, 2017).
97 See supra notes 66-75 and accompanying text.
98 Id. These defendants are also more likely to be able to retain their job, if they had one,
and thus have more money available to hire an attorney. They are also able to visit an
attorney more frequently at the attorney’s office as opposed to relying on the attorney to visit
a potentially distant jail. See Foote, supra note 20, at 1147 (discussing these and other
comparative disadvantages for detained defendants).
99 TRACEY KYCKELHAHN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, JUSTICE EXPENDITURE AND
EMPLOYMENT EXTRACTS, 2012 - PRELIMINARY tbl.1 (2015), http:www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?
ty=pbdetail&iid=5239 (follow “Comma-delimited format (CSV)” hyperlink; then select
“jeeus1201.csv” filename).
100 Id. at DEFINITIONS OF TERMS AND CONCEPTS.
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government funds certain state or local criminal justice costs.101
With more trial and pre-plea procedures, all types of
expenses—from the cost of building and supplying courtrooms and
public defender and prosecutor offices to paying personnel wages—
would likely increase due to currently long waits for trials and the
need for more courthouses and staff.
For comparison, federal spending on one of the agencies that
received the least federal funding—the Environmental Protection
Agency—was approximately $7 billion in fiscal year 2015.102
The empirical data discussed in Part I shows that pretrial
detention increases the likelihood of a defendant’s pleading guilty
by somewhere between 18 and 25 %.103
If half of the defendants
currently detained were released, guilty pleas might decline by
somewhere between 9 and approximately 12%. Due to fixed capital
expenditures, economies of scale, and other factors,104 sending
this many more defendants to trial or more complex plea bargaining
negotiations would not cause criminal justice costs to rise by this
same percentage.105 Nonetheless, the additional resources required
to maintain current prosecution and conviction rates would be
significant.
Bail and pretrial detention thus play an important role in
making current conviction rates possible at existing funding levels.
But in addition to playing a key functional part in enabling the
status quo of high rates of plea-induced convictions and associated
incarceration and supervision, bail makes this problematic system
politically feasible, as explored in Part III.
Id.
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, HISTORICAL TABLES:
BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES. GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2017, tbl.4.1 (2016) (listing the
2015 outlay for the Environmental Protection Agency as $7,007,000,000).
103 See supra notes 57, 61, 66 and accompanying text (discussing several studies linking
pretrial detention and guilty pleas).
104 See CHRISTIAN HENRICHSON & SARAH GALGANO, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, A GUIDE TO
CALCULATING JUSTICE-SYSTEM MARGINAL COSTS 4–5 (2013), http://www.bja.gov
/publications/vera_calculating-justice-system-marginal-costs.pdf (defining marginal cost as
“the amount the total cost changes when a unit of output . . . changes” and noting that
marginal costs for “administrations, utilities, and other expenses” in prisons do not change
much with slight decrease in prison populations, whereas “expenses such as food, clothing,
and medical care” do change noticeably).
105 See id. at 13 (showing actual average per-inmate costs of prisons in Washington State
as $31,446, with long-run marginal costs of $13,921 and short-run marginal costs of $4,495,
and per-inmate costs of jail as $28,900, with long-run marginal costs of $21,469 and shortrun marginal costs of $3,457).
101
102
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III. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF BAIL AND ITS ROLE IN
MAINTAINING THE STATUS QUO
Lobbying by the bail bond industry has long been recognized as
a source of opposition to pretrial justice reform.106 And, indeed,
public choice analysis suggests that such a concentrated financial
interest would be difficult for criminal defendants, a diffuse and
politically unpopular class, to overcome.107 But the widespread use
of money bail and pretrial detention create additional barriers not
just to changes to the pretrial process but to criminal justice reform
as a whole. First, the use of money bail neatly separates criminals
into two categories: in one category are those with assets who can
obtain release and are thus better able to exercise their rights and
mount a vigorous defense, and in the second are those without
assets who cannot afford release and often receive cursory process
as a result.108 This separation of the moneyed from the poor likely
plays a significant role in maintaining the status quo because the
better-represented moneyed classes would almost certainly demand
reform of a system that routinely treated them or their families the
way that it treats the indigent. Second, because money bail and
pretrial detention help produce quick, cheap convictions, and
because prosecutors’ and judges’ careers and reputations often
depend, at least to some extent, on the number of convictions they
obtain or the number of cases they process,109 these powerful
stakeholders have an incentive to leave the system as it is.

106 See Wiseman, supra note 7, at 1381-82 (observing that “[f]or nearly a hundred years,
the existence of a powerful commercial bondsmen lobby—and a lack of interest in the plight
of poor defendants—has hampered reform efforts”).
107 Specifically, a public choice account suggests that a relatively small group of wealthy,
concentrated, and organized interests that individually have more to gain or lose from a
decision will have more influence in the political process than a diffuse, less-organized group
of individuals who collectively have more to gain or lose from the decision but lack the
resources to overcome the transaction costs of organizing. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF
COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 2 (1965) (“[U]nless the
number of individuals in a group is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some other
special device to make individuals act in their common interest, rational self-interested
individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interest.”).
108 See infra Part III.A (analyzing state and federal statutes that guide bail determination
and concluding that the bail system sorts defendants by wealth).
109 See infra notes 178 and 193 and accompanying text (noting political pressure on
prosecutors and judges to meet numerical thresholds).
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A. AVOIDING POLITICAL POOLING

Routine pretrial detention and the summary convictions it helps
produce would probably be infeasible if members of politically
powerful groups were regularly subjected to this system. If they
were, those with money and the political wherewithal that comes
with it would likely lobby for and obtain reform.110
But
the
U.S. bail system, which sorts individuals based on their incomes, is,
perversely, a perfect mechanism for separating the politically
powerful from the politically weak.111 Thus, the criminal justice
system avoids pooling these two groups and instead gives a robust
series of procedural protections to those who can afford bail access
112 (which, as discussed above, would be quite costly if extended to
the entire population). This separation, then, helps entrench the
status quo.
Low-income, minority defendants have relatively little clout in
the political process. 113 A public choice theory of governance
attributes this phenomenon to the fact that this population of
criminal defendants involves large numbers of relatively
disorganized voters—many of whom cannot vote due to prior
convictions114—who lack the funds and other resources needed to
overcome organizational barriers and meaningfully influence the
political process.115 In contrast, middle and higher income
110 See, e.g., Craig S. Lerner, Legislators as the “American Criminal Class”: Why Congress
(Sometimes) Protects the Rights of Defendants, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 599, 602–03 (2004)
(observing that when politically powerful individuals like legislators face potential criminal
sanctions reform sometimes results).
111 See Cohen & Reaves, supra notes 1 and accompanying text (noting the high rate of
pretrial detainees who are in jail because they cannot afford bail, as opposed to being denied
bail, and the high right of defendants who cannot afford modest bail amounts); see also infra
note 117 and accompanying text (noting that many defendants cannot afford even low bail
amounts).
112 See infra notes 129-48 and accompanying text (discussing the protections given to
individuals with the financial resources to afford bail).
113 See Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of Public
Choice; or, Why Don’t Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the Accused?, 44
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1079, 1090 (explaining that young black men, the most common targets of
police investigations, represent a small part of the nation’s electorate).
114 See The Sentencing Project, Fact Sheet: Felony Disenfranchisement 1 (2011),
https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Felony-DisenfranchisementLaws-in-the-US.pdf (estimating that, as of 2010, 5.85 million Americans had “currently or
permanently lost their voting rights as a result of a felony conviction”).
115 See, e.g., Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1113, 1137 (2007)
(describing how “criminal defendants have little, if any, political clout” due to the fact that
they are not repeat players in the political system and the small number of organized groups
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defendants are far more likely to have the resources, time,
sophistication, and connections that make political influence more
feasible. These defendants, due largely to their class as well as
“speech, dress, knowledge of their rights, and access to counsel,” are
better able to take advantage of “protective rules” within the system
and thus avoid many of its harshest consequences.116
If this latter, more influential class of defendants were subjected
to the high pretrial detention, plea, and conviction rates experienced
by lower income defendants,117 they would likely lobby for
legislative fixes and pressure elected judges and prosecutors to
change their practices to lower these rates. Moreover, in the absence
of a sorting mechanism, some of the benefits of this lobbying would
potentially benefit the less politically powerful class of
defendants.118 But bail acts as a class-dividing scalpel, severing the
link between higher and lower income defendants. Higher income
defendants can easily afford the bail amounts set.119 They also use
the statutes designed to protect lower income defendants in the bail
process to their own benefit, arguing that even if they face highlevel charges, release accompanied by high bail amounts and
expensive pretrial monitoring will ensure their appearance and
protect the public while they await trial.120 Thus, bail further
exacerbates the divisions between the elite and lower class

that represent these defendants are “generally politically weak”); Cristina M. Rodriguez,
Constraint Through Delegation: The Case of Executive Control over Immigration Policy, 59
DUKE L.J. 1787, 1825 (2010) (noting criminal defendants’ weak political position because
“they are an unsympathetic and unorganized constituency”); William J. Stuntz, supra note
80 (describing how criminal defendants are now a “political bogey”).
116 Natapoff, supra note 28, at 83.
117 See COHEN & REAVES, supra note 1, at 7 (noting “[c]onviction rates were higher for
detained defendants, with 78% convicted”).
118 It is not clear empirically how much beneficial spillover can occur, of course. See, e.g.,
Lerner, supra note 110, at 602-03 (arguing that “spillover in procedural protections” occurs).
But see William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV.
781, 796, 799-800 (2006) (noting that “procedural limits on white-collar investigations” maybe
“an easier political sell,” but rejecting the proposition that legislators only protect the
interests of wealthy defendants).
119 See COHEN & REAVES, supra note 1, at 1 (showing that only one out of six defendants
detained pretrial was denied bail; the remaining five out of six were detained because they
could not afford bail); id. at 3 (showing a median bail amount of $9,000 and a mean of
$35,800).
120 See infra notes 150-156 and accompanying text.
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defendants in Alexandra Natapoff’s “penal pyramid.”121 It is one of
the many tools used at the very bottom of the pyramid, where
“[s]uspects and defendants are handled in the aggregate based on
discretionary police and prosecutorial decision-making.”122
In
other words, bail is one of the many “mechanisms for
institutionalizing disadvantage and conferring privilege”123 within
the system; indeed, one could reasonably argue that it is one of the
most powerful mechanisms available for this type of sorting.
Most criminal defendants encounter the criminal justice system
at the local and state level,124 and the majority of courts within these
jurisdictions use money bail schedules to determine defendants’ fate
before trial.125 These schedules, which are established by judges or
legislatures,126 are mandated in some jurisdictions and encouraged
in others, and many judges use them.127 The schedules typically
assign a specific dollar amount or range for the bail that defendants
must post, and the amount is based solely on the types of crimes
charged.128 For example, the California statute addressing bail
121 See Natapoff, supra note 28, at 72 (“The penal system can be thought of as a pyramid in
which law itself functions very differently at the elite top than it does at the sprawling
bottom.”).
122 Id.
123 Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra Natapoff, Introduction: Mapping the New Criminal
Justice Thinking, in THE NEW CRIMINAL JUSTICE THINKING 15 (Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra
Natapoff eds., 2017).
124 See CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEFENSE COUNSEL IN
CRIMINAL CASES 4 (2000), http://bjs. gov/content/pub/pdf/dccc.pdf (noting that
“[a]pproximately 95% of criminal defendants are charged in State courts”).
125 See PRETRIAL JUSTICE INSTITUTE, supra note 26 (“Between 1990 and 2004, the
percent of cases where courts were requiring felony defendants to post a money bail . . .rose
54 percent to 69 percent.”).
126 Lindsey Carlson, Bail Schedules: A Violation of Judicial Discretion? 26-SPG Crim. Just.
12, 13 (2011) (noting that the schedules are sometimes “promulgated through state law”); see
also, e.g., Cal. Penal Code §1269b (c) (directing each superior judge in each California county
to “prepare, adopt, and annually revise a uniform countywide schedule of bail for all bailable
felony offenses” and misdemeanors).
127 See Carlson, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 13 (noting that the
schedules are “mandatory or merely advisory”); PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., supra note 29,
at 7 (noting that of 112 counties responding to a 2009 survey, 64 percent reported that judges
use bail schedules).
128 See PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., supra note 29, at 7 (noting bail schedules’ “exclude
consideration of factors other than the charge”); Lindsey Carlson, supra note 126, at 13
(noting that bail schedule amounts are “based upon the offense charged”). Cf. Brief for
American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellees and Affirmance at 15,
Walker
v.
Calhoun
(11th
Cir.,
case
no.
10521),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/images/abanews/walker_v_calhoun_amicus.p
df_ (opposing the use of bail schedules because, inter alia, “the nature or name of the charge
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schedules directs judges to “consider the seriousness of the offense
charged” and does not include any other factors.129 Bail schedules
do not take into account defendants’ ability to pay.130 And although
many bail amounts on the schedule would appear to be low and
affordable, many defendants cannot afford these seemingly low
amounts—for example, a $2,000 bond that must be posted within
thirty days.131 Indeed, 44% of felony defendants held on bail are
detained pretrial because they cannot afford bail set at amounts less
than $1,000.132 Compounding this problem is the fact that many
seemingly affordable bail amounts are increasing, with average bail
amounts doubling in the past two decades.133 Further, despite state
statutes that often direct judges to take into account other factors,134
as discussed below, these discretionary factors tend to benefit the
wealthy, who hire sophisticated attorneys to make complex
procedural arguments against detention.
Thus, wealthy defendants avoid what they would likely view as
a highly unjust system in which they were rapidly pushed through
the courts, jailed while awaiting trial, and pressured to agree to a
quick plea deal, making this class of defendants relatively content
with the status quo. In contrast, vast numbers of low-income,
politically weak defendants are subjected to this system and lack
the resources to change it.135 Additionally, the few pretrial
against the defendant may have little to do with the need for particular conditions on
release”).
129 Cal. Penal Code §1269b (e).
130 Id.
131 See Anamaria Lusardi et al., Financially Fragile Households: Evidence and
Implications, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 83–84 (2011) (showing that 25 percent
of Americans cannot afford this amount).
132 Leslie & Pope, supra note 61, at 530 (citing Mary T. Phillips, N.Y.C. CRIMINAL JUSTICE
AGENCY, INC., A DECADE OF BAIL RESEARCH IN NEW YORK CITY 149 (2012)).
133 Compare PHENY Z. SMITH, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN
LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 1990, 9 tbl.11 (1993) (reporting that, in 1990, the mean bail was
$7,400 for released defendants and $21,700 for pretrial detainees) with BRIAN A. REAVES,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 2009 –
STATISTICAL TABLES 19 tbl.16 (2013) (noting that the mean bail for all defendants in 2009
was $55,400).
134 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3967 (West 2018); FL. STATS. ANN. § 903.046 (West
2018); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-15-30 (West 2018) (all requiring consideration of factors nearly
identical to those required under the federal Bail Reform Act including, for example, family
ties and “character and mental condition”).
135 See Shima Baradaran, The State of Pretrial Detention, in THE STATE OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 2011 187, 190 (Myrna S. Raeder ed., 2011) (showing that total pretrial detainees
were approximately 500,000); State Policy Implementation Project, A.B.A. CRIM. JUST. SEC.
2,
http://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/criminal_justice/spip_
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protections that have been achieved through political reform tend
to offer little benefit to this class because they lack sophisticated
attorneys or other resources to take advantage of these
provisions.136 The statutes intended to protect low-income
defendants—which, in practice, further benefit wealthy defendants
without providing much protection for the poor—expand the divide
between the two classes of defendants in the pretrial and plea
process and further prevent potentially beneficial pooling.
For federal defendants, the Bail Reform Act (BRA) directs a judge
at a detention hearing to consider a variety of conditions in
determining whether to release or detain a defendant.137 Some of
these considerations appear to affect wealthy and low-income
defendants evenly, such as the type of charges and weight of the
evidence against the person.138 While the act states that “[t]he
judicial officer may not impose a financial condition that results in
the pretrial detention of the person,” 139 detention of low-income
federal defendants is common.140 Specifically, the act directs judges
to release defendants on personal recognizance (a promise that they
will appear) or an unsecured appearance bond (one that does not
require money) on the condition that the person not commit any
crimes ” during the period of release.”141 Judges may only impose
additional conditions, including a money bond, if they determine
that these non-monetary conditions would not “reasonably assure”
appearance at trial or community safety.142 And if judges do impose
monetary conditions, the BRA prohibits them from setting “a

handouts.authcheckda-pdf (observing that two-thirds of these defendants are non-dangerous
defendants who are also low flight risk but cannot afford bail).
136 See Wiseman, supra note 56, at 452–53 (describing reforms that rely more on actuarial
risk assessment to predict likely pretrial flight or dangerousness in setting bail or requiring
pretrial detention); COHEN & REAVES, supra note 18, at 4 (showing four states (Oregon,
Illinois, Kentucky, and Wisconsin) that prohibit the use of commercial bail and explaining
that the “District of Columbia, Maine, and Nebraska have little commercial bail activity”).
137 See generally 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (2012).
138 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) (2012).
139 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(2) (2012).
140 THOMAS H. COHEN, PRETRIAL DETENTION AND MISCONDUCT IN FEDERAL DISTRICT
COURTS, 1995-2010 1 (2013), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pdmfdc9510.pdf (noting
that in 2010, 76% of federal defendants were detained pretrial and that although much of
this percentage consists of immigration defendants, the percentage of other types of
defendants is also high—for example 84% of drug defendants).
141 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b) (2012).
142 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c) (2012).
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financial condition that results in the pretrial detention of the
person.”143
Despite the apparently clear bar on detention for inability to pay,
courts have interpreted the BRA to allow detention when
defendants, due to their income or other circumstances preventing
them from paying, cannot post the bond set by the court. 144
The
courts justify this result because, as the First Circuit describes the
circumstances, the defendant is detained “not because he cannot
raise the money, but because without the money, the risk of flight
is too great.”145 Moreover, defendants with relatively low incomes
who are unable to meet bail are often unsuccessful in persuading a
court that there are any conditions that would reasonably assure
the safety of the community or their appearance at trial. For
example, a New York federal district judge considered the
defendant’s $50,000 personal recognizance bond (requiring $1,500
in money down) to be “modest.”146 He proceeded to determine the
defendant’s two bond co-signers were not “financially responsible”
and could not guarantee a payment of $50,000, concluding that the
bail package was insufficient to reasonably assure appearance at
trial.147 Thus, detention resulted directly from the defendant’s
financial inability to meet the bail amount set in the case. Indeed,
the judge found that he was not required to “engage in a
hypothetical or metaphysical meditation upon whether some
combination of conditions might be imagined which would assure a
defendant’s appearance.”148 This is an implied concession that
relatively low-income defendants will have a much more difficult
time proving reasonable assurances in light of their inability to
afford expensive home confinement, monitoring, or similar
conditions in addition to their difficulty meeting the basic money
bail requirements.
The “reasonable assurances” portion of the BRA has largely
failed to benefit low-income defendants—those whom this language,
in concert with the prohibition on the imposition of financial
conditions that lead to pretrial detention, was designed to protect.
18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(2) (2012).
Wiseman, supra note 7, at 1396 n.234.
145 Id. (quoting United States v. Jessup, 757 F.2d 378, 389 (1st Cir. 1985),abrogated by
United States v. O’Brien, 895 F.2d 810, 810 (1st Cir. 1990).
146 United States v. Lair, No. 06CR 1068, 2007 WL 325776, at * 5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2007).
147 Id. at *5.
148 Id. at *4.
143
144
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In contrast, wealthy defendants, relying on sophisticated
procedural arguments made by skilled attorneys, have used the
language quite effectively.149 For example, one criminal defendant
accused of acquiring and exporting products “capable of triggering
nuclear weapons” to Pakistan persuaded a federal judge that his
posting of $100,000 in cash, detention at home under an electronic
monitoring program paid for by the defendant, and provision of a
$75,000 third-party bond would “reasonably assure” his appearance
at trial under the BRA.150
Another defendant, Marc Dreier, who fraudulently acquired
more than $400 million,
also managed to convince a federal
court to release him under conditions that included home detention
with electronic monitoring and private “armed security guards,”
among other conditions. 151 The guards reportedly cost $70,000
monthly.152
The court directly recognized that Dreier’s wealth
had provided him with a distinct advantage in the pretrial process
as compared to a poor defendant.153 But it concluded based on
Dreier’s attorney’s persuasive arguments that release was justified,
finding:
It cannot be gainsaid that many kinds of bail conditions
favor the rich, and, conversely, that there are many
defendants who are too poor to afford even the most
modest of bail bonds or financial conditions of release.
This is a serious flaw in our system. But it is not a
reason to deny a constitutional right to someone who,
for whatever reason, can provide reasonable assurances
against flight.154
In 2016, a defendant with more than $600,000 in home equity
assets, who posted a $500,000 secured bond and agreed to home
149 See Jonathan Zweig, Note, Extraordinary Conditions of Release Under the Bail Reform
Act, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 555, 563–566, 559 (2010) (describing how Bernie Madoff and Marc
Dreier were able to benefit from the Bail Reform Act and criticizing the bail system for
privileging the wealthy).
150 United States v. Karni, 298 F. Supp. 2d 129, 130–31, 133 (D.D.C. 2004).
151 U.S. v. Dreier, 596 F. Supp. 2d 831, 832–33 (S. D.N.Y. 2009).
152 Elaine Silvestrini, Reggae Star’s Pretrial Release at Own Expense Raises Questions,
TAMPA BAY TIMES (Mar. 22, 2013), http://www.tbo.com/arts_music/reggae-stars-pretrialrelease-at-own-expense-raises-questions-27820.
153 Dreier, 596 F.Supp.2d at 833.
154 Id. (emphasis added); see also Zweig, supra note 149, at 556 (discussing the Dreier case).
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detention and monitoring, similarly succeeded in arguing that these
were reasonable assurances of community safety under the BRA
despite having been charged with numerous violent crimes,
including , for example, murder and kidnapping.155 This was also
despite a rebuttable presumption that no conditions would
reasonably assure community safety due to a previous grand jury
indictment of the defendant.156
Additional BRA language further tips the scales in favor of
wealthy defendants—particularly the factor involving “the history
and characteristics of the person.”157 This prong includes “[t]he
person’s character, physical and mental condition, family ties,
employment, financial resources, length of residence in the
community, community ties, past conduct, history relating to drug
or alcohol abuse, criminal history, and record concerning
appearance at court proceedings.”158
It is now widely documented that low-income individuals, and
particularly individuals from certain racial groups, are
disproportionately targeted for arrest and charged with crimes.159
Thus, individuals from these groups are more likely to have
criminal histories.160 Further, indigent defendants without housing
or employment stability will have more difficulty showing
community ties, a lengthy residence within one community, or a
solid job history or current employment situation.161
United States v. Enix, 209 F.Supp.3d 557, 564, 574-76 (W.D.N.Y. 2016).
Id. at 562.
157 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(3) (2012).
158 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(3)(A).
159 See CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE
DEPARTMENT,
62–64
(2015),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/pressreleases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf
(finding
that
African Americans experience a statistically disparate impact in nearly every aspect of the
law enforcement system in Ferguson, Missouri); see also William J. Stuntz, Substance,
Process, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 20 n.51 (1996) (noting
“[t]he fact that the large majority of criminal defendants qualify for appointed counsel
suggests how disproportionately poor defendants are” and that, in some parts of the country,
at least 80-85% of defendants qualify for free counsel) (citing Richard Klein, The Eleventh
Commandment: Thou Shalt Not Be Compelled to Render the Ineffective Assistance of Counsel,
68 IND. L.J. 363, 379 n.102 (1993) and Jeffrey R. Rutherford, Comment, Dziubak v. Mott and
the Need to Better Balance the Interests of the Indigent Accused and Public Defenders, 78
MINN. L. REV. 987, 987 n.48 (1994)).
160 See, Stuntz, supra note 159, at 20 (“Criminal suspects and defendants are much more
likely than the general population to be poor and black.”).
161 See, e.g., Samuel Wiseman, Discrimination, Coercion, and the Bail Reform Act of 1984:
The Loss of the Core Constitutional Protections of the Excessive Bail Clause, 36 FORDHAM
155
156
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Many state statutes that guide judges’ bail determinations direct
judges to apply similar criteria. For example, Washington, D.C. uses
identical language to the BRA in directing judicial officers to
consider whether there are conditions of release that will protect the
safety of the community and assure appearance at trial.162
South Carolina and Vermont similarly list identical factors to
the BRA to be considered in release determinations but require
consideration of “character and mental condition” rather than
physical and mental condition.163 Arizona requires judges to
consider the “accused’s family ties, employment, financial
resources, character and mental condition” in “determining the
method of release or the amount of bail.”164 Florida has a similar list
but also, like the Bail Reform Act, includes “length of residence in
the community.”165
Some states go even further than the Bail Reform Act in
requiring judges to consider factors that might weigh against lowincome defendants in the bail determination. For example, Rhode
Island has a rebuttable presumption that any defendant charged
with drug-related offenses—offenses for which a disproportionate
percentage of the defendants are low-income defendants166—poses
“a danger to the safety of the community,” 167 thus making it more
likely that the defendant will be detained pretrial.
Although these and other statutes might appear to somewhat
limit judges’ discretion in the pretrial release determination, the
statutes also give judges wide latitude to balance the factors and
make personal judgments in deciding whether to release a
defendant.168 Psychological biases in favor of wealthy defendants
URB. L.J. 121, 155–56 (2009) (discussing how these factors, which grant judges broad
discretion, allow judges to make arbitrary and discriminatory bail decisions).
162 D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322 (West 2018).
163 S.C. CODE ANN § 17-15-30(A)(4) (West 2018); VT. STAT ANN. tit. 13, §7554(6)(2) (West
2018).
164 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3967(B)(7) (West 2018).
165 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 903.046(c) (West 2018).
166 See, e.g., Deena Greenberg, Note, Closing Pandora’s Box: Limiting the Use of 404(B) to
Introduce Prior Convictions in Drug Prosecutions, 50 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 519, 523 (2015)
(noting that “drug enforcement disproportionately focuses on low-income communities”).
167 12 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. 1956, § 12-13-5.1 (West 2018).
168 See Baradaran Baughman, Costs, supra note 15, at 3 (“The current balancing process
that judges use to make pretrial release and detention decisions is laden with individual
biases and ad hoc heuristics that make these decisions unpredictable.”); id. (noting that
individuals who are charged with identical crimes who live in similar neighborhoods
experience dramatically varied pretrial release outcomes).
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deemed more responsible and trustworthy therefore also affect the
judicial decision. A factor as simple as the quality of the defendant’s
clothing sometimes influences a judge’s decision to release or
detain.169 Indeed, studies indicate that defendants charged with
the same crime, appearing before the same judge, and exhibiting
similar characteristics with respect to dangerousness and flight risk
nonetheless receive meaningfully different treatment. For example,
in one case study of a courthouse’s bail practices, out of three
defendants facing marijuana-related charges, who appeared before
the same judge on the same day and had similar backgrounds, two
were assigned bail amounts of $500, and a third had to pay
$2,000.170
The combination of statutes that provide procedurally offensive
strategies for wealthy defendants and the common use of money
bail, which explicitly benefits wealthier defendants, creates a
distinctly two-track system. Wealthy defendants largely avoid the
worst aspects of a system characterized by high pretrial detention,
plea, and conviction rates, thereby maintaining and entrenching a
status quo that is increasingly recognized as unjust171 and
economically inefficient.172
B. CLEARING DOCKETS

As argued above, cash bail and pretrial detention contribute to
high
incarceration
rates
by
helping
produce
cheap
convictions.173Because prosecutors and judges face professional
pressure to process a high volume of cases, these groups—both key

169 See Mitchell P. Pines, An Answer to the Problem of Bail: A Proposal in Need of Empirical
Confirmation, 9 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 394, 408 (1973).(“An unusual appearance, from
the type of jacket to the length of hair, may elicit different bail decisions for the same crime.”).
See also Wiseman, Fixing Bail, supra note 56, at 441 (describing highly subjective bail
decisions).
170 Id. See also Wiseman, Fixing Bail, supra note 56, at 447, n. 186 (noting this problem).
171 See supra note 30 (outlining due process concerns related to the current bail system).
172 See Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Address at the National Symposium
on Pretrial Justice (June 1, 2011) https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-ericholder-speaks-national-symposium-pretrial-justice (noting that many defendants are jailed
pretrial due solely to their income); see also CHRISTIAN HENRICHSON & RUTH DELANEY, VERA
INST. OF JUSTICE, THE PRICE OF PRISONS: WHAT INCARCERATION COSTS TAXPAYERS 6 (2012),
https://storage.googleapis.com/vera-web-assets/downloads/Publications/price-of-prisonswhat-incarceration-costs-taxpayers/legacy_downloads/price-of-prisons-updated-version021914.pdf (noting the extremely high costs of state prisons to taxpayers).
173 See supra Part II.

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2018

33

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 53, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 5
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

268

12/18/2018

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:235

stakeholders in criminal justice reform174—have an incentive to
resist efforts to make obtaining convictions a lengthier and more
difficult process by reducing pretrial detention.
Prosecutors are overburdened with cases—facing “extreme
docket pressure”175—yet they work under stringent performance
expectations and tend to be ambitious politically. 176
District
177
attorneys’ electorates demand convictions, or at least that is the
presumption of many prosecutors with electoral concerns in mind.178
The political factors that contribute to high incarceration
rates—including, as argued above, the bail system’s sorting of
defendants by wealth179—have entrenched a prosecutorial reward
and incentive structure that tends to encourage high conviction
rates, and indeed, prosecutors tend to receive promotions and better
pay when they achieve higher conviction rates.180 And individual
prosecutors’ personal incentives have been well-documented.181
Even for the many prosecutors who operate under the best
intentions, obtaining large numbers of convictions through quick
plea bargains is far easier than slogging through slow trials or

See supra note 38 (noting the political influence of prosecutors and judges).
Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone’s Revenge: An Essay on the Political
Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 601 (2005); see also Barkow,
supra note 9, at 39 (“In many offices, an emphasis is placed on processing as many cases as
possible because of crushing caseloads.”).
176 See Bibas, supra note 13, at 2472 (noting that prosecutors “are a politically ambitious
bunch” and “have incentives to take to trial only extremely strong cases and to bargain away
weak ones”).
177 See, e.g., Stuntz, supra note 80, at 537–38 (observing that “local prosecutors must satisfy
local public demands” and that “anything that converts contested trials into guilty pleas”
benefits prosecutors).
178 See Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can
Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 58 n.63 (1991) (“For subordinato [sic]
prosecutors in larger offices, promotion and internal evaluation depends largely on the ability
to produce convictions.”); see also Mary De Ming Fan, Disciplining Criminal Justice: The Peril
Amid the Promise of Numbers, 26 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 43 (2007) (noting the importance
of “win-loss statistics” to prosecutors).
179 See supra Part II.C.
180 See Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction
Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125, 135 n.40 (2004) (citing several articles suggesting
that upward mobility as a prosecutor is dependent on high conviction rates).
181 See id. at 153-54 (noting that “[m]any prosecutors have political ambitions extending
beyond the district attorney’s office”); see also Guido Calabresi, The Current, Subtle—and Not
So Subtle—Rejection of an Independent Judiciary, Address at the Owen J. Roberts Memorial
Lecture (Jan. 31, 2002), in 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 637, 639 (2002) (describing political pressures
faced by prosecutors).
174
175

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol53/iss1/5

34

Wiseman: Bail and Mass Incarceration
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

2018]

BAIL AND MASS INCARCERATION

269

complex pretrial negotiations that result in fewer convictions.182
Judges’ incentives, too, seem strongly skewed toward practices
that reduce docket pressure. The desire to process cases as quickly
and efficiently as possible, combined with tunnel vision and
entrenchment of familiar bureaucratic rules,183 generates strong
resistance to reform. In one extreme example, after a federal district
court enjoined the use of the money bail system previously followed
in Harris County, Texas, it appears that many state judges
purposefully induced higher failure-to-appear rates by, for example,
providing misinformation about court dates, scheduling appearance
requirements the day after defendants’ late-night release from jail,
and releasing defendants who were the highest risk for nonappearance without supervision.184 Their goal, it appears, was to
make alternatives to money bail—those required by the
injunction—seem unworkable.185 One of the few Harris County
judges who resisted this goal described the other judges’ attempts
as efforts to “sabotage the federal injunction and to manipulate the
bond-forfeiture statistics to make it look like people released on
unsecured bond pursuant to the federal order are failing to appear
in droves.”186
A decision denying bail and requiring pretrial detention tends to
induce quick plea bargains, thus making the work of prosecutors
182 See Alkon, supra note 15, at 200–01 (noting that prosecutors “can expect cases to be
easily resolved in the plea bargaining process” and that “[s]imply asking for prosecutors to
exercise more discretion to return to earlier filing rates, and file fewer cases, is unlikely to
have the necessary far-reaching impact”); see also, Rachel Barkow, Administering Crime, 52
UCLA L. REV. 715, 728 (2005) (noting other tools that prosecutors use in order to make their
task—obtaining convictions—easier and observing that “[p]rosecutors have an incentive to
lobby for harsher sentences because longer sentences make it easier for them to obtain
convictions through plea bargaining”).
183 See Barkow, supra note 9, at 33 (noting that the criminal justice system has expanded
because of the bureaucracies created in response to the violence of the 1960s and 1970s).
184 Appellees’ Opposition to Motion of Appellants Fourteen Judges of Harris County
Criminal Courts at Law for Stay of the Preliminary Injunction and Entry of a Modified
Conjunction Reflecting this Court’s Ruling at 13–14, ODonnell v. Harris Cty., 892 F.3d 147
(5th Cir. 2018) (No. 17-20333) [hereinafter Appellees’ Opposition to Motion] (describing the
“policies and practices” judges allegedly used “to deliberately increase the likelihood that an
arrestee released on unsecured bond” would not appear).
185 See id. at 15 (describing the abovementioned practices as “an attempt to ‘deliberately
undermine’ the federal order and evidence of a ‘[c]lear[] … hope … that the reformed bail
process fails’”) (quoting Gabrielle Banks & Mihir Zaveri, Dozens of jail inmates miss out on
pretrial help as county struggles with bail order, HOUS. CHRON. (July 12, 2017),
https://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Dozens-of-jail-inmates-miss-out-onpretrial-help-11281893.php.).
186 Appellees’ Opposition to Motion, supra note 184, at Exhibit 1, p. 1.
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and judges easier. Indeed, in Brady v. United States, which affirmed
the legality of plea bargaining, the Supreme Court emphasized the
resource-based advantages of plea bargaining, noting that “with the
avoidance of trial, scarce judicial and prosecutorial resources are
conserved.”187 The literature has documented a correlation between
greater constraints on court time and plea bargaining rates,188 and
that “because of severe budgetary pressure on prosecutors,” plea
bargains are “viewed as an essential tool for managing large case
loads.”189 These dynamics can create a race to the bottom because
prosecutors who seek unaffordable bonds less often feel pressure to
keep up with their peers’ conviction metrics.
Some competing incentives might help to push back against this
temptation, such as the personal recognition and acclaim that
accompanies high-profile, drawn-out trials.190 But these incentives
are likely somewhat weak as compared to those pushing toward
large numbers of convictions obtained through plea bargains.
Pretrial detention and quick pleas present a convenient pathway to
these results.191
Prosecutors, important stakeholders in reform
debates, thus have an incentive to oppose any reforms that would
reduce the ease of plea bargains, including policies that would
reduce pretrial detention rates.192
Judges, too, face intense docket pressures and have too few
resources to clear dockets in a timely fashion. And, like prosecutors,
they are penalized for failing to meet numerical thresholds. As
Nancy King and Ronald Wright note, “court administrators can now

397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970).
See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
189 Mongrain & Roberts, supra note 80, at 8;see also George Fisher, Plea Bargaining’s
Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857, 865, 893-96 (2000) (arguing that prosecutorial incentives—and
particularly their “crushing workloads”—were and are the strongest cause of the rise of plea
bargains); Landes, supra note 22, at 64 (“Scarce resources provide an incentive for the
prosecutor to avoid a trial and negotiate a pre-trial settlement with the defendant.”).
190 See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 14, at 2472 (noting that prosecutors might “push strong or
high-profile cases to trial to gain reputation and marketable experience”).
191 See STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 32 (2012) (“Plea bargains
guarantee certainty of conviction and punishment.”).
192 There are, of course, exceptions to the norm. Some prosecutors have led bail reform
efforts in their jurisdiction. See, e.g., INST. FOR INNOVATION IN PROSECUTION, PROSECUTORS
& BAIL: USING DISCRETION TO BUILD A MORE EQUITABLE AND EFFECTIVE SYSTEM (2017),
https://university.pretrial.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?Document
FileKey=c019f5c3-2f4e-b516-dddd-c24f05e95642&forceDialog=0 (describing instructions
from the Cook County, Illinois State’s Attorney to assistant attorneys indicating that they
should “affirmatively support release on recognizance” in certain types of cases).
187
188
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hold individual trial judges accountable for each tiny variation in
docket speed and related administrative cost.”193 Plea
bargains
provide an easy way around these challenges, allowing for rapid
case disposition and easing judges’ workloads.194 Indeed,
state
trial judges are routinely pushed to not only induce pleas but to
induce earlier pleas, reducing “the number of conferences and
hearings for each case [and] freeing up the time of attorneys, judges,
court staff, and sheriff’s personnel.”195 Thus, there may be a race to
the bottom here, too, as judges insistent on providing defendants
with more meaningful process risk clearing fewer cases than their
peers, thus dimming their future prospects. They also help to
preserve an appearance of criminal justice system integrity,
“erasing the possibility of either factual or legal error” associated
with judgments.196
The strong incentives pushing the most powerful players in the
criminal justice system away from linked bail and plea bargain
reform make changes to this system more difficult, particularly
given existing, direct opposition to bail reform from well-organized
stakeholders such as the bail bondsman lobby.197
IV. AN INTEGRATED APPROACH: IMPLICATIONS FOR REFORM
EFFORTS
The link between bail, pretrial detention, plea bargaining,
conviction rates, and sentence length might serve as both a benefit
and impediment to efforts to reform the incarceration system as a
whole as well as bail, specifically. On the positive side, it serves as
yet another justification for bail reform, and it provides a key tool
in the arsenal of policies attempting to reduce the size of the U.S.
prison population. Yet it also might subject bail reform efforts to
193 Nancy J. King & Ronald F. Wright, The Invisible Revolution in Plea Bargaining:
Managerial Judging and Judicial Participation in Negotiations, 95 TEX. L. REV. 325, 327
(2016)
194 See Fisher, supra note 169, at 867 (noting that soon after the rise of the use of plea
bargains, “[j]udges apparently discovered that they had more power to spur pleas in criminal
cases than to coerce settlements in civil cases” and that as they faced higher civil case
burdens, they used plea bargains to resolve “more and more criminal cases by guilty plea”).
195 King & Wright, supra note 193, at 357.
196 Fisher, supra note 194, at 867.
197 See Wiseman, supra note 97, at 1381–82 (noting that the bondsman lobby “has
hampered reform efforts”); FEELEY, supra note 18, at 214-15 (describing bail bondsmen as
contributing to pretrial difficulties for defendants).
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increased scrutiny from those who support maintenance of current
charge and incarceration rates. Just as bail reform might be a subtle
but meaningful way of reducing U.S. incarceration numbers—thus
suggesting that incarceration reform efforts should recognize the
importance of bail—bail reformers must also be aware of the
broader implications of reform, including the potential need to
better fund other parts of the criminal justice system in order to
achieve a conviction rate acceptable to both stakeholders and the
public.
A. PRETRIAL REFORM AS AN INSTRUMENT OF SYSTEMIC CHANGE

Bail reformers have recently celebrated a number of striking
successes, as evidenced by recent court decisions impacting
California and Houston as well as significant changes to bail policies
in populous areas like New Jersey and Atlanta.198 Reform
proponents have made constitutional arguments on due process and
equal protection grounds, pointing to the gross injustice of a system
explicitly focused on income yet designed to be blind to defendants’
ability to pay.199 Indeed, equal protection arguments raised by
reform attorneys have now been successful in several U.S. district
court cases.200 If ultimately adopted by higher courts, these rulings
could dramatically reshape the pretrial landscape.
The most direct contribution of the bail–mass incarceration link
is thus to further support what appears to be a quickening reform
pace. Beyond constitutional arguments, the bail-mass incarceration
link simply provides more fuel for the fire. In the event that higher
courts do not consistently follow the equal protection and due
process doctrine currently building in the bail reform context, it
supports a strong political case for reform. Somewhat less directly,
See supra notes 2–4 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Heaton et al., supra note 7, at 770–71 (noting potential empirical support for
the argument that money bail violates equal protection and due process); see also Shima
Baradaran, Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 723, 766–75 (2011)
(arguing for pretrial due process rights); Miller & Guggenheim, supra note 7,357–58, (arguing
that pretrial detention violates due process in some circumstances); Jeff Thaler, Punishing
the Innocent: The Need for Due Process and the Presumption of Innocence Prior to Trial, 1978
WIS. L. REV. 441, 465–70 (1978) (arguing for due process protections pretrial).
200 The group Equal Justice Under Law, raising equal protection arguments, among others,
has “filed 12 challenges against money bail in 9 states,” leading to the abolition of money bail
in seven communities. See Equal Justice Under Law, Ending American Money Bail,
http://equaljusticeunderlaw.org/money-bail-1/; see also supra note 34 for a description of some
of these cases.
198
199
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focusing on the bail-mass incarceration link could provide a more
promising path in the long effort to reduce the burgeoning U.S.
prison population.
Despite a drop in crime in recent decades, the U.S. incarceration
rate remains stubbornly high.201 The incentives driving a relatively
high demand for convictions in the United States have been widely
discussed in the literature.202 Surveys consistently indicate that the
public preference for relatively aggressive policing and prosecution
of criminal defendants does not waver much: the public believes
that there are high crime rates even when they have declined,203
in part due to disproportionate media coverage of violent
crime.204 Moreover, the groups most directly impacted by high
incarceration rates also tend to have relatively little political
clout.205 Thus, local and state judges and prosecutors, the majority
201 See John F. Pfaff,, Review: Waylaid by a Metaphor: A Deeply Problematic Account of
Prison Growth, 111 Mich. L Rev 1097, 1098-1102 (2013) (describing many accounts of
decreasing crime rates and increasing incarceration but criticizing them as missing key
points, such as the fact that certain types of crime rates of increased).
202 See, e.g., KATHERINE BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY
AMERICAN POLITICS 79–88 (1997) (describing politicians’ explanation that they are
implementing tough-on-crime policies in response to public demand); see also Paul H.
Robinson et al., The Disutility of Injustice, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1940, 1979 n.133 (2010) (arguing
that politicians, not the public, often drive tough-on-crime policies); Tom R. Tyler & Robert J.
Boeckmann, Three Strikes and You Are Out, but Why? The Psychology of Public Support for
Punishing Rule Breakers, 31 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 237, 239–40 (1997) (exploring various
explanations for the public’s tendency toward punitiveness). But see Stuntz, supra note 118,
at 801 (noting that “Americans seem to value both privacy and process more than they once
did” and arguing that constitutional criminal procedural protections that give too few rights
to defendants but displace certain legislative action have thwarted needed change). Stuntz
has, however, also focused on how public demand for crime control and politicians’ response
to it have resulted in criminal injustice. See William J. Stuntz, supra note 80, at 509.
203 See Sara Sun Beale, The News Media’s Influence on Criminal Justice Policy: How
Market-Driven News Promotes Punitiveness, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 397, 418 (2006) (“Public
opinion polls in the United States throughout the 1990s and into the current decade
demonstrated high levels of anxiety about crime, a persistent unawareness of the drop in
crime rates, and strong support for more punitive measures.”); id. (noting that “national
polling indicates that a majority of the public is not aware that crime has decreased
dramatically”); Francis T. Cullen et al., Public Opinion About Punishment and Corrections,
27 CRIME & JUST. 1, 8, 58 (2000) (reviewing numerous surveys and observing that they
confirm that “the public is punitive toward crime” but that “[i]t is not clear that most citizens
are highly committed to one fixed view toward the sanctioning of lawbreakers”).
204 See Beale, supra note 203, at 422 (describing extensive media focus on crime and its
likely impact on public opinion); Cullen et al., supra note 203, at 58 (observing that “opinions
about crime fluctuate and are likely to become more harsh if citizens are told disturbing
stories about offenders and the nation's crime problem by the media or bully-pulpit
politicians.”).
205 See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
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of whom are elected, tend to promise tough-on-crime results, as do
policymakers.206 And as Rachel Barkow has documented, the
sprawling criminal justice bureaucracy that built up during the
high-crime era “created agencies and actors who have a vested stake
in any efforts to contract the system.”207 Indeed, these actors have
developed a sort of “tunnel vision”—one rooted in the efficient
processing of as many cases as possible, and in which the “tradeoffs
and downsides” of the system are ignored.208
In the face of these dynamics, significant reductions in the
incarceration rate have been difficult to achieve.209 Although
pretrial reform is far from a magic bullet, the data suggest it could
have important downstream effects.210 As this Article documents,
detention paves the way for quicker prosecutions and allows
prosecutors to charge more defendants, and it appears to be an
important
yet
under-appreciated
contributor
to
mass
incarceration.211 Modifying or eliminating the money bail system is,
relatively speaking, a small change compared to more radical
reform proposals aimed more broadly at mass incarceration.
Moreover, two additional features of reduced pretrial detention
rates suggest it could be a promising locus of reform for groups
working to reduce incarceration rates. First, it can lead to
immediate financial savings on pretrial detention.212 Per-inmate
costs for the pretrial population range from approximately $50 to
$123, with annual jail costs ranging from $84 million to more than

206 See, e.g., Keith Swisher, Pro-Prosecution Judges: “Tough on Crime,” Soft on Strategy,
Ripe for Disqualification, 52 ARIZ. L REV. 317, 327–32 (2010) (describing judges’ campaign
promises to be tough on crime); Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to
Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125, 153 (2004) (“[P]articularly in recent
years, the generalized campaign theme adopted by a candidate running for the office of chief
prosecutor is from the tough-on-crime category.”).
207 Barkow, supra note 9, at 33.
208 Id. at 36.
209 See, e.g., Oregon Criminal Justice Comm’n, Report to the Legislature: Incarceration,
Costs and Crime, 19 FED. SENT’G REP. 267, 267 (2007) (describing how between 1980 and
2005, the U.S. “incarceration rate more than tripled going from 1.34 to 4.52 persons
incarcerated per 1,000”).
210 See Laura and John Arnold Found., supra note 4 (showing that pretrial reform in pilot
jurisdictions has helped reduce jail populations and pretrial crime rates).
211 See PFAFF, supra note 6, at 133–34 ( “To date, however, no state- or federal-level
proposal aimed at cutting prison populations has sought to explicitly regulate [prosecutorial]
power”).
212 See Wiseman, supra note 7, 1357 (observing that pretrial detention rates impose high
costs on the public given the expenses of operating detention facilities).
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$800 million.213 Indeed, those supporting New Jersey’s reforms have
focused largely on the fact that they immediately reduced the size
of the state’s incarcerated population, of which pretrial detainees
make up a large part, and associated costs.214 And in Harris County,
Texas, bail reform created nearly $4.5 million in avoided costs in
one year.215
Second, bail reform mostly benefits low-level
offenders and the innocent.216 It lowers innocent defendants’
likelihood of pleading guilty if they have been released rather than
detained pretrial. And if reform causes judges to consider
empirically-tested characteristics that more accurately predict
dangerousness and flight risk, it favors the release of nondangerous defendants. Thus, reform tends to affect the populations
who have historically suffered most distinctly from the U.S.
incarceration policy.217
B. BLUNTING STAKEHOLDER OPPOSITION

Despite the support that the bail-mass incarceration link
provides for reform efforts, bail reformers should also recognize that
some impediments to their arguments—which have been largely
focused on inequality, as well as the practical budgetary
consequences of high pretrial detention rates218—might arise from
the knowledge that bail reform would tend to reduce conviction and
incarceration rates.219 Thus, efforts to modify the bail system might
find more traction if they were accompanied by proposals to
maintain somewhat high conviction rates by shifting savings from
reduced pretrial detention toward other parts of the criminal justice

Id. at 1358.
See supra note 8; see also GLENN A. GRANT, N.J. COURTS, JAN. 1-DEC. 31 2017 REPORT
TO
THE
GOVERNOR
AND
THE
LEGISLATURE
20
(2018),
https://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/courts/assets/criminal/2017cjrannual.pdf (showing record
lows in total jail and pretrial populations in the January 2015-January 2018 time period).
215 ARTHUR W. PEPIN, CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADM’RS, 2012-2013 POLICY PAPER:
EVIDENCE-BASED PRETRIAL RELEASE 8 (2013), https://cosca.ncsc.org/~/media/Microsites/
Files/COSCA/Policy%20Papers/Evidence%20Based%20Pre-Trial%20Release%20Final.ashx.
216 See Laura and John Arnold Found., supra note 4 (noting that many of the individuals
held in jail before trial are low-level offenders that pose little risk to public safety).
217 See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 6, at 6–7 (documenting the impacts of mass
incarceration on low-income African-American defendants).
218 See supra notes 7–8.
219 For a discussion of the links between bail and high plea rates, and between pleas and
easier convictions, see supra notes 15-20.
213
214
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system. Of course, this would have the perverse effect of eliminating
the benefits of bail reform in terms of its reduction of mass
incarceration. But perhaps some compromise could be struck, in
which the public accepted somewhat lower incarceration rates if
adequately high savings from bail reform and maintenance of public
safety could be demonstrated. To the extent that the benefits of bail
reform—particularly the budgetary ones—outweigh the effects of
reducing incarceration, which are viewed negatively by many
politicians and stakeholders,220 bail reform could be an effective
means of chipping away at incarceration rates. Some of the
substantial cost savings of bail reform noted in Part III.A could be
used to coopt opposition from prosecutors and judges.
Bail has been historically resistant to reform,221 however, and
there is likely to be a continued need for effective advocacy
regardless of the outcomes in court.222 To that end, understanding
the role pretrial detention plays in letting prosecutors and judges
do their jobs on a day-to-day basis might help advocates find ways
of mitigating resistance. For example, bail reform advocates who
might otherwise oppose a budget increase for the district attorney’s
office could support it as a part of a reform significantly reducing
pretrial detention—recognizing both that prosecutors’ workload
would likely increase and that some of the money could come from
reduced spending on pretrial detention. Similarly, judges’
opposition might be muted by support for more criminal courts and
judicial staff, along with a shift in focus away from measuring and
maximizing “productivity” and towards providing meaningful
process in criminal cases—or at least towards lower productivity
targets.
Further, reducing the incarceration rate would of course also
generate substantial savings. Corrections expenses make up a large
portion of the criminal justice budget—as much as 57% at the state
level, by some estimates.223 One 2012 study of 40 states found total
correctional costs of $39 billion when expenses such as corrections
department retiree healthcare and health care for inmates were
See supra note 38 and 180-195 and accompanying text.
See Heaton et al., supra note 7, at 716–17 (noting that, despite the issues associated
with current bail policy, it has persisted throughout the nation and is unlikely to shift absent
evidence that it does more harm than good).
222 See Wiseman, supra note 56, at 422–23 (describing judges’ continued practice of setting
bail that leads to pretrial detention despite a growing legislative movement to the contrary).
223 KYCKELHAHN, supra note 99, at Tbl. 1 (providing FY 2012 data).
220
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included,224 with an average per-inmate cost of $31,286 annually.225
Federal prisons, which have grown even more than state
detention systems in recent decades, cost approximately $6.7 billion
in 2013.226 Thus, by not spending more on the trial process,
jurisdictions end up spending more on imprisonment. Rebalancing
spending would result in fewer, but higher quality, convictions.
The dynamics of pretrial reform could also help minimize the
concerns of those wishing to be, or appear, “tough on crime.”
Although bail reform broadly benefits low-income defendants,227 the
defendants most likely to be released pretrial under reformed bail
systems will, in many cases, be those for whom there is less evidence
of dangerousness and who have been charged with relatively lowlevel crimes.228 And if prosecutors have to give up certain plea
bargains as a result of lower pretrial detention rates, they are likely
to jettison the least serious cases and the cases with the weakest
evidence. Thus, the defendants who otherwise would have been
convicted under a plea, or who have more bargaining power in the
plea bargaining process because they have not been detained
pretrial, will not generally be the most notorious, dangerous

HENRICHSON & DELANEY, supra note 172, at 60.
Id. at 9.
226 Pew Charitable Trusts, Federal Prison System Shows Dramatic Long-Term Growth 1
(2015) http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2015/02/pew_federal_prison_growth.pdf.
227 Bail reform efforts like those described in New Jersey and Atlanta substantially curtail
the use of money bail, which, as documented here and in prior work, is most detrimental to
low-income defendants who tend to be unable to afford the bail amounts set. See supra notes
125-133. Furthermore, there is a compelling case that bail—and particularly its tendency to
induce pleas, even by those who are innocent—specifically harms innocent defendants. See
supra note 79 and accompanying text.
228 One of the most broadly-implemented reforms uses empirically-tested models to better
predict flight and dangerousness and thus enables the release of more defendants but only
those shown to be least likely to commit crimes or flee pretrial. See Laura and John Arnold
Found., supra note 4 (noting that twenty-one jurisdictions have adopted the Public Safety
Assessment, which has been shown to “increase public safety while reducing jail
populations.”). The recently-implemented reforms in Atlanta and New Jersey similarly focus
on reducing the use of pretrial detention for non-dangerous defendants with low flight risk.
See GRANT, supra note 214at 2, 13, (noting that under the New Jersey reforms prosecutors
may “move for the pretrial detention of defendants whom the prosecutor believes are too
dangerous for release” and showing that more than 8,000 of the more than 42,000 complaintwarrant defendants for whom release decisions were made in 2017 were detained pretrial);
ATLANTA, GA., ORDINANCE 18-O-1045, supra note 4, at 1 (finding that “for future arrestees
charged solely with non-violent offenses, the City of Atlanta wishes to allow release from the
Atlanta City Detention Center after booking, on a recognizance or signature [non-monetary]
bond”).
224
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criminals who typically receive the brunt of public attention and
who generate “tough on crime” demands.
V. CONCLUSION
The United States is in the midst of a mass incarceration crisis
which has endured for years. More than two million Americans are
in prison—a higher percentage than in any other country.229
Approximately 3% of all black males in the United States are
incarcerated.230 And as a vast literature has noted, this system is
extraordinarily expensive in addition to being racially
discriminatory, overcrowded, dangerous, drug-ridden, and
inadequately attentive to serious major health (including mental
health) and sexual assault problems, among a host of other
problems.231
Pretrial incarceration, too, has reached a point of crisis.232 It
would be surprising if the two phenomena were entirely unrelated.
On a fundamental level, both reflect our internationally-anomalous
zeal for locking up our fellow citizens, the bases for which remain a
subject of vigorous debate. More immediately, though, pretrial
detention of indigent defendants and high overall incarceration
rates are interconnected in underappreciated ways. As argued
above, pretrial detention of the poor lowers the cost of convictions
by inducing quick guilty pleas while ensuring that wealthier, better
represented groups retain access to higher quality process and
better outcomes, reducing the political appetite for both pretrial bail
reform and reductions in the incarcerated population more
broadly.233 This effect is exacerbated by the role pretrial detention
plays in producing the high conviction and docket-clearance rates to
which the public has become accustomed and on which the careers
229 Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Critical Perspectives on Police, Policing, and Mass
Incarceration, 104 GEO. L.J. 1531, 1552 (2016).
230 Aliza Cover, Cruel and Invisible Punishment: Redeeming the Counter-Majoritarian
Eighth Amendment, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 1141, 1142 (2014).
231 See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 229, at 1552–53 (summarizing the literature); id.
at 1537-39 (describing how mass incarceration affects Latinos and Native Americans in
addition to African-Americans); supra note 6 (noting the expansion of the criminal justice
system in response to the racial upheaval of the 1960s).
232 A system in which nearly two-thirds of defendants in jail are there because they cannot
afford bail is, by many measures, a system in crisis. See State Policy Implementation Project,
supra note 135, at 2.
233 See supra Parts I & III.A.

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol53/iss1/5

44

Wiseman: Bail and Mass Incarceration
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

2018]

BAIL AND MASS INCARCERATION

279

of prosecutors and judges, both key stakeholder groups, may
hinge.234
All of this suggests that pretrial bail reform and curtailing the
use of cash bail could play a non-trivial role in lowering overall
incarceration rates, and that recognizing and addressing the
concerns of stakeholders invested in the status quo could help
reduce opposition to this reform. More broadly, absorbing the full
cost of providing a meaningful adversarial process to all defendants,
regardless of wealth, might push jurisdictions towards methods
beyond arrest and prosecution for addressing crime and the
underlying social problems that contribute to it. Indeed, if spending
on prosecutions increases, the relative cost of programs such as
mental health and drug addiction treatment, education and
vocational training, and housing assistance decreases.
None of this is to suggest, however, that even radical pretrial bail
reform would drastically reduce incarceration rates. It very likely
would not; the pathologies underlying our enormous demand for
imprisonment can probably not be countered by improved process
alone. Nonetheless, any reduction in incarceration rates would be,
in some sense, a bonus. Reducing detention rates is well worth doing
for its own sake.

234

See supra notes 180-65, 173–74 and accompanying text.
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